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TORT LAW AND COMMUNITARIANISM: WHERE
RIGHTS MEET RESPONSIBILITIES*
Robert M. Ackerman**
In this article, Dean Ackerman suggests how communitarian prin-
ciples could be utilized within basic tort doctrines. He begins by pro-
viding a brief overview of communitarianism, paying great attention
to Professor Amitai Etzioni's four-point agenda on rights and respon-
sibilities. Next, Dean Ackerman considers what effects communitarian
thought could have on tort law. Dean Ackerman proposes that com-
munitarianism could be used not only to expand tort duties, but also
to limit remedies for injuries. He also addresses possible conflicts that
arise when these two principles compete. In conclusion, the article
suggests how communitarianism might improve the processes used to
resolve tort claims.
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INTRODUCTION
Between the extremes of authoritarianism and libertarianism lies the
sane middle ground of communitarianism. Communitarians believe that
even (or perhaps especially) in a rights-conscious society, rights have lim-
its, and involve concomitant responsibilities. For example, one has a right
to trial by jury, but one also has the responsibility to serve on a jury when
called upon. Citizens have the right to be secure from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion, but air traffic controllers and railroad engineers
must submit to periodic drug testing in deference to the legitimate inter-
ests of the community. Communitarians support basic civil liberties, but
fear that our ability to confront societal problems effectively is compro-
mised by the claims of "radical individualists"' who would subordinate
the needs of the community to the absolute fulfillment of individual
rights. "A Communitarian perspective recognizes both individual human
dignity and the social dimension of human existence." 2 Communitarians
have therefore suggested an agenda to advance commonly held social val-
ues without unduly compromising individual rights.3
Most communitarian writing to date has concentrated on the role of
the family, schools, business, the media, and governmental institutions.4
Although there have been some efforts to introduce communitarian
thought into the field of contracts,5 few overt attempts have been made to
1. See AmITAi ETzIoNI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 11 (1993).
2. Id. at 253 (quoting the Communitarian Platform).
3. See id. at 251-67.
4. See, e.g., id.; see generally THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, a journal of communitarian
thought.
5. See, e.g., IAN R. MAmCuI, THE NEw SocIAL CONTRACi. AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 71-117 (1980); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract
Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 842 (1983); Howard 0. Hunter, Creativity and Responsibility:
[Vol. 30
TORT LAW
graft communitarian philosophy to tort doctrine.' This article is an effort
to address that void. Tort litigation is frequently our society's method of
sorting out the rights and responsibilities of individuals and institutions
with respect to one another. The law that emerges from tort litigation
helps define the boundaries of human interaction: what is acceptable con-
duct; what are the limitations of one's rights; what responsibilities to
others accompany those rights. During the past thirty years, the protec-
tions furnished by the law of torts have expanded, and with that expan-
sion has come an augmentation of the duties owed to one's fellow
citizens.7 Some commentators see a need for additional duties, such as a
duty to assist persons in peril.8 There is, however, a growing
sense-evidenced by both scholarly9 and popular0 literature-that tort
litigation has provided remedies to individuals without due deference to
the responsibilities that such individuals owe themselves, and without
recognition of the considerable burdens these remedies place on others.
Under this view, modern tort law represents a perverse triumph of radical
individualism. Tort law-in particular, the law pertaining to remedies for
personal injury-is therefore an appropriate area to examine in light of
communitarian principles.
This article is an effort to consider how communitarian thinking
might apply to tort law. Its intent is exploratory: to suggest a few areas of
inquiry, to highlight some problems, to test concepts. I do not mean to
"invent" dogma (indeed, that would be contrary to my understanding of
communitarianism), but rather to suggest doctrinal guidelines and invite
Perspectives on Covenant, Contract and the Resolution of Disputes, 36 EMORY L.J. 533, 538
(1987); Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 483, 519 (1985).
6. But see Mary Ann Glendon, Does the United States Need "Good Samaritan"
Laws?, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMsuNrrY 9, (1991) [hereinafter Glendon, Good Samaritan] (arguing
in favor of a duty to rescue in criminal rather than tort law); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Be-
tween Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Cau-
sation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1561 (1986) [hereinafter Baruch Bush, Between
Two Worlds] (suggesting that the shift from individual to group responsibility in tort law is
a positive development).
7. The "fall of the citadel" of privity, which heralded the expansion of products lia-
bility, is the most prominent augmentation of tort duties. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Another example is the expansion of liability for the
criminal acts of third parties. E.g., Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 369 A.2d 38, 40-42
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). The abrogation of charitable, family, and governmental
immunities also illustrates the expansion of tort duties. E.g., Albritton v. Neighborhood
Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ohio 1984) (subjecting charitable organiza-
tion to liability for tort to the same extent as an individual or corporation); Hack v. Hack,
433 A.2d 859, 868-69 (Pa. 1981) (abolishing defense of interspousal immunity); Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Ed., 305 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. 1973) (abrogating governmental immu-
nity in action against school board).
8. E.g., Glendon, Good Samaritan, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES (1988); PAUL H. RUBm, TORT REFORM By CONTRACT (1993).
10. See, e.g., JOE KOHUT, So SUE ME (1993); Dave Barry, Lawyers Get Their Teeth
into Some Real Class Action, CHL TRIu., Dec. 5, 1993, Sunday Magazine, at 33; Mike Royko,
Legal System Has Had One Too Many, CH. TaRB., Sept. 25, 1990, at C3.
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comment. I admit to being largely sympathetic toward communitarian-
ism, but claim to be neither a spokesman nor an apologist for the move-
ment. Like many of those who are attracted to communitarianism, I am
still feeling my way.11
I. COMMUNITARIANISM BRIEFLY EXPLAINED
The communitarian movement is young, even by American stan-
dards. A platform, initially drafted by Professor Amitai Etzioni (who may
be appropriately described as the movement's founder), 12 was issued on
November 18, 1991.13 Some seventy "leading Americans" have endorsed
the platform, including conservatives and liberals, Republicans and
Democrats."4
In his definitive book, The Spirit of Community, Professor Etzioni
describes communitarianism as "a social movement aim[ed] at shoring up
the moral, social, and political environment."' 5 This can be accomplished,
says Etzioni, without fear of plunging into "a dark tunnel of moralism
and authoritarianism." 6 To this end, Etzioni proposes a four-point
agenda on rights and responsibilities. First on this agenda is a morato-
rium on "the manufacturing of new rights," because "the incessant issu-
ance of new rights, like the wholesale printing of currency, causes a
massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims."17 Professor
Etzioni supports this point with several examples, including death row
inmates' claims to reproductive "rights" through artificial insemination, a
student's claim that he had the "right" to admission to a high school
honor society,' and a claim by bankers lobbying against federal interest
11. This non-dogmatic approach is probably endemic to middle-of-the-roaders, and is
likely to subject me to accusations of fuzzy thinking and namby-pambiness. I will readily
confess that I lack the moral certitude of the "True Believer." See EaIc HOFFER, THE TRUE
BELEVER xli (1951) (describing the true believer as the man of fanatical faith who is ready
to sacrifice his life for a holy cause).
12. Social scientist Amita Etzioni is currently a professor at George Washington Uni-
versity. A refugee from Nazi Germany, Etzioni grew up in a cooperative settlement in Israel
and served in that nation's military. After obtaining a degree from the Hebrew University,
Etzioni came to America to attend graduate school at Berkeley. He has since taught and
lectured at a number of universities.
13. See Glen Elsassee, "We" Generation, CHL Tam., Nov. 3, 1994, Tempo, at 1.
14. ETZIoNI, supra note 1, at 18, 251.
15. Id. at 247.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 5.
18. To this we might now add Tonya Harding's claim that she had a "right" to a place
on the Olympic figure skating team. See Bob Baum, Harding Strikes Back With Lawsuit,
PHmA. INQUntER, Feb. 10, 1994, at D1.
Of even more recent vintage (and of greater significance) is a promise by a politically
beleaguered President of a "Middle Class Bill of Rights." President Bill Clinton, Televised
Address Proposing Middle Class Tax Breaks (Dec. 15, 1994) (transcript available in N.Y.
TiAms, Dec. 16, 1994, at A36). To President Clinton's credit, his January 24, 1995 State of
the Union Address evidenced a more communitarian approach:
[A]ll Americans have not just a right, but a solid responsibility to rise as far as
their God-given talents and determination can take them. And to give something
[Vol. 30
TORT LAW
rate regulation that Americans had a "right" to keep their credit cards.19
In each instance, Professor Etzioni reminds us that "each newly minted
right generates a claim on someone."20 Rights, in other words, are not
cost-free, and therefore should be carefully examined to see if they are
important enough to justify the cost.
The second item on the communitarian agenda is that rights pre-
sume responsibilities.2 1 "Buried deep in our rights dialect," writes
Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon, "is an unexpressed premise
that we roam at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively have
no obligations toward others except to avoid the active infliction of
harm. '22 To me at least, the recognition of responsibilities owed to others
does not necessarily carry with it the imperative that a new series of legal
obligations be imposed through governmental flat. Underlying communi-
tarianism appears to be the notion that as members of a community we
are morally obligated to undertake certain responsibilities, and that if we
must wait for the authorities to compel us to discharge our civic duties,
the main point most likely is lost. Whether affirmative obligations to
others should be embodied in the law, rather than left to the honor of the
individual actor, is an issue which I will later address briefly in a tort
context.
Third on the communitarian agenda is the recognition that certain
responsibilities may exist without an immediate payback in the form of
capturable rights.23 A responsibility to the environment, the destruction
of which may affect future generations far more gravely than our own, is
Etzioni's most obvious example.2 4 Underlying this concept is a sense of
commitment to the greater good, a recognition that we are all part of a
larger community that does not end at our doorstep. The selfish pursuit
of one's own aggrandizement will not shore up the moral, social, and po-
litical environment.
The fourth item on the communitarian agenda calls for "careful ad-
back to their communities and their country in return. Opportunity and respon-
sibility-they go hand in hand; we can't have one without the other, and our
national community can't hold together without both .... We simply cannot
wait for a tornado, a fire, or a flood to behave like Americans ought to behave in
dealing with one another.
President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 1995) (transcript available in
N.Y. Thmis, Jan. 25, 1995, at A17-A18).
19. This brings to mind a case in which I defended a bank that had ordered a cus-
tomer's credit card confiscated after she had exceeded her credit limit and had failed to pay
her bill for several months. Bringing suit for intentional infliction of mental distress, the
customer's lawyer told the jury that the bank had interfered with his client's "constitutional
right to peace of mind."
20. ETzioNi, supra note 1, at 5-6.
21. Id. at 9.
22. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK THE ImpovERisHiENT OF PoLrrIcAL DIsCOURSE
77 (1991).
23. ETZIoNI, supra note 1, at 10.
24. Id. at 11.
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justments" to reconcile individual rights with the public welfare.2" Says
Professor Etzioni, "[t]he best way to curb authoritarianism and right-
wing tendencies is to stop the anarchic drift by introducing carefully cali-
brated responses to urgent and legitimate public concerns about safety
and the control of epidemics."2" For example, it is not an unwarranted
intrusion to test health care workers for the AIDS virus. Although whole-
sale testing of the entire population may not be justified, the assertion of
individual rights cannot thwart reasonable efforts to contain a most seri-
ous epidemic.
2 7
In short, "I've got mine, Jack," can no longer be the rallying cry;
instead, one should "ask not what your community can do for you, but
what you can do for your community. '2 8 No single solution or legislative
agenda will fully address the communitarian ideal; indeed, the absence of
a doctrinaire solution to problems is endemic to a movement that avoids
the extremes and cultivates a diversity of views. Although communitari-
ans will subscribe to common principles, such as the importance of basic
civil liberties, the term "doctrinaire communitarianism" is oxymoronic, in
that the movement is an eclectic one that views few things in terms of
absolutes.2 9 What I present in the pages to follow, then, is not "the com-
munitarian view" of tort law, but rather how one individual with commu-
nitarian leanings might see tort doctrine affected by a communitarian
approach.
]EI. APPLICATION OF COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT TO TORT LAW
Much as the philosophy of Sun Yat-Sen was claimed by both Com-
munists and Kuomintang in China, communitarian thought could be ap-
propriated by both those who wish to expand the range of tort liability
25. In an article that predates Etzioni's book, Professor Baruch Bush explained that
"[tihe 'communitarian theory' of society claims to avoid both the individualist excesses of
liberalism and the collectivist excesses of welfarism by stressing the central role of commu-
nity as a personal and social good and as a mediating structure between the individual and
the society as a whole." Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds, supra note 6, at 1530.
26. ETZiONI, supra note 1, at 11.
27. Likewise, reasonable limitations may be placed on the right to bear arms in recog-
nition of the need for public order. The shrill protests of the gun lobby, along with the
menace of the militia movement, have demonstrated that radical individualism is not the
exclusive province of the left. See Peter Applebome, Terror in Oklahoma: The Extremists,
N.Y. Timas, Apr. 23, 1995, at A33.
28. This adaptation of the familiar refrain from President John F. Kennedy's inaugu-
ral address raises the question of whether communitarianism is just old wine in new bottles.
In many respects, communitarianism resembles New Deal or New Frontier liberalism. Presi-
dent Kennedy's creation of the Peace Corps finds at least a faint echo in President Clinton's
establishment of the AmeriCorps. See Taylor Jones, No Place Like Home for Peace Corps,
SUN SENTNEL, Mar. 19, 1995, at 3. Each generation employs its own language, however, and
there is no harm in broadening the tent (to include, for example, Republicans disinclined to
follow New Deal rhetoric) by recasting the platform in language suitable to the Nineties.
29. My refusal to capitalize the word "communitarian," as Etzioni does, is consistent
with a nondoctrinal approach. The day that communitarians exercise blind allegiance to a
little red book is the day I can no longer claim to be a communitarian.
[Vol. 30
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and those who would limit it. Communitarianism's call for greater respon-
sibility to one's fellow citizens might be seen as a rationale for the expan-
sion of tort duties-for example, imposition of a duty to rescue those in
peril-resulting in more widespread liability. The communitarian sugges-
tion that we check the expansion of rights, however, could also be applied
to the tort law to limit remedies for harm, both real and imagined.
In this article, I shall first suggest a few areas in which communitar-
ian philosophy-in particular, the notion that we are all our brothers' and
sisters' keepers-might serve as a basis for broadening legal responsibili-
ties to others, thereby expanding tort liability. I will then suggest some
areas in which the communitarian inclination to check the expansion of
rights should result in a limitation of tort liability. Some cases in which
the two values may compete are then discussed. Finally, I will suggest
how communitarian values might apply to the processes we use to resolve
tort claims.
A. Situations in Which Communitarian Principles Might Suggest an
Expansion of Tort Liability
1. Rounding out the negligence concept
Despite the increased popularity of strict liability, negligence remains
the prevailing theory of tort liability.30 Any first-year law student can re-
cite the elements of a cause of action for negligence: (1) a duty of care; (2)
a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach of duty
and the plaintiff's injury; and (4) a cognizable injury.3 1 Difficulty arises,
however, in determining the proper duty of care. Generally speaking, the
duty of care requires one to behave in such a manner that one's conduct
does not expose others to unreasonable risks. 2 Inherent in that statement
30. Several commentators, including some who decry the expansion of tort liability,
attribute this phenomenon largely to expanding notions of negligence. See, e.g., James A.
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND.
L.J. 467, 477-522 (1976) [hereinafter Henderson, Expanding Negligence]; Gary T. Schwartz,
The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L.
REv. 601, 699-700 (1992). But see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
461, 463 (1985) (describing the development and judicial acceptance of enterprise liability as
the foundation of the modern civil liability regime). Even in products liability, "strict" lia-
bility often boils down to a test resembling that which is used for negligence. See, e.g.,
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 601 (1980).
31. W. PAGE K.ETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 30, at 164
(5th ed. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Beatty v. Central Iowa R.R., 12 N.W. 332, 335 (Iowa 1882); Chicago, B &
Q R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 882-83 (Neb. 1902); Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93
(N.Y. 1919); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs § 283 cmt. c (1965) ("Negligence is a depar-
ture from a standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk.").
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is a limitation on liability: one's conduct can expose others to risks with-
out giving rise to liability, so long as those risks are reasonable."5
Yet the law of torts has traditionally limited duties owed to others
short of even this paradigm of reasonableness . 4 There is a long line of
"no duty" cases in which no liability has been imposed," despite the fact
that the defendant's behavior appears to have imposed unreasonable risks
on others.8" Prototypical is the immunity usually conferred upon social
hosts, sued by people who have been injured (usually in automobile acci-
dents) due to the intoxication of guests at events hosted by the defen-
dants. The courts have long held commercial vendors of alcohol liable for
such injuries, 37 but have typically proclaimed that social hosts providing
alcohol to their intoxicated guests bear no responsibility to their ultimate,
foreseeable victims.38 The social host owes "no duty" and is therefore not
liable. Here, what passes for an explanation is no more than a conclusion.
Why is there no duty? The social host who continues to lubricate her
guests with intoxicants, knowing that they will shortly be taking to the
streets in their automobiles, certainly has behaved in an irresponsible
manner. The potential harm is imminently foreseeable, and there is little
33. This view is embodied in the Learned Hand Formula, set forth in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), and the Restatement's utility/risk
balancing test, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 291 (1965).
34. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv.
537, 556 (1972) (discussing the emergence of the paradigm of reasonableness and the demise
of the paradigm of reciprocity).
35. See, e.g., Chastain v. Fugua Indus., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. App. 1980)
(holding that aunt had no duty to warn eleven-year-old nephew of loose seat on power
mower); Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903) (holding that railroad
owed no duty of care to injured trespasser); Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928)
(holding that defendant owed no duty to respond to the deceased's outcries after canoe
overturned); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that defendant owed no
duty to rescue drowning victim where defendant did not force victim into dangerous
position).
36. For our purposes, we can accept the Restatement's definition of an "unreasonable"
risk as one in which the utility of the conduct producing the risk is exceeded by the risk.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 291.
37. See, e.g., Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098, 1102-03 (Colo. 1986) (imposing
common law liability on tavern owner who sold alcohol to intoxicated patron who thereafter
injured a third person); Nehring v. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329, 1333-34 (Mont. 1986) (apply-
ing Montana statutory law to impose liability on tavern operator).
38. In some jurisdictions, the rationale for this distinction has been the existence of a
statutory scheme to regulate commercial vendors, the violation of which gives rise to liabil-
ity. No liability is imposed on social hosts in the absence of a statutory violation. See, e.g.,
Manning v. Andy, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (Pa. 1973) (holding only persons licensed by statute to
sell intoxicants are civilly liable to injured parties). This rationale is supported only if the
boundaries of tort law are circumscribed by criminal law, a notion rejected in countless
other cases. E.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973) (de-
fendant clothing manufacturer's compliance with federal Flammable Fabrics Act did not
preclude verdict against it for marketing dangerously flammable fabric); Christou v. Arling-
ton Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 432 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ill. App. 1982) (evi-
dence of compliance with building code was properly excluded in determining defendant's
negligent failure to use safety glass); Curtis v. Perry, 18 P.2d 840, 843 (Wash. 1933) (defend-
ant driver's signalling for turn in compliance with law was not due care per se).
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or no utility to the host's conduct. Nevertheless, courts tend to view the
imposition of liability as an unconscionable burden on an alcohol-infatu-
ated public.39
Similar treatment has been accorded manufacturers and retailers of
dangerous firearms, who are allowed to place lethal weapons on the
streets, seemingly oblivious to the consequences. I am not talking here
about legitimate hunting rifles or even handguns which a shop owner
might employ in self-defense. I refer instead to weapons such as Colt's
AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, a military assault rifle which has no legiti-
mate use on the streets, or even in the forests, of a civilized society.40
Prior to the enactment of legislation banning such weapons outright,41 the
courts-which had been willing to impose liability for the sale of toys,
automobiles, prescription drugs, and numerous other products-feigned
paralysis, unwilling to hold merchants of death accountable for the car-
nage from which they profit.42 Although application of the most funda-
mental utility/risk analysis would give rise to liability in many instances,
the courts have nevertheless persisted in granting what amounts to a spe-
cial privilege to purveyors of dangerous firearms, a privilege enjoyed by
neither drug manufacturers, the asbestos industry, producers of sports
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 788 P.2d 159, 164 (Haw. 1990);
Miller v. Moran, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Ill. App. 1981); Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507,
510-11 (Pa. 1983). But see McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146
(Mass. 1986); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1230 (N.J. 1984), superseded by statute as
stated in Wagner v. Schlue, 605 A.2d 294 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1992).
I would distinguish between cases brought by innocent third parties who are injured by
intoxicated guests, and those brought by the intoxicated guest who is herself injured. The
latter "victim" shares in the responsibility, and probably is most to blame. For example, in
Del E. Webb Corp. v. Superior Court of Arizona, 726 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1986), the decedent
was found dead in the pool of a resort with a .27 blood alcohol level. The decedent's wife
sued the resort for wrongful death. The court, in permitting the defendant to raise contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk as affirmative defenses, stated that "[t]he interests of
the public are better served by the common law principles that make most persons responsi-
ble for their conduct." Id. at 586. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 127-42
and accompanying text.
40. I have previously referred to this and similar firearms as "the weapon of choice of
mass murderers." Robert M. Ackerman, Mass Murderers Prefer Semiautomatic Rifles, N.Y.
T'nms, Mar. 2, 1989, at A26. In Pennsylvania, such weapons are illegal for hunting, 34 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2322(a)(2) (1995), yet the courts of that state remain reluctant to impose
liability for injuries foreseeably caused by their manufacture and sale. See, e.g., Mazzillo v.
Banks, 536 A.2d 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), allocatur denied, 542 A.2d 1370 (Pa. 1988).
41. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 restricts the manu-
facture, sale, and ownership of a number of assault weapons. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Sec.
110102, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-98 (1994).
The District of Columbia currently has a statute imposing strict liability upon manufac-
turers and sellers for injuries caused by assault weapons. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2392 (1995).
42. E.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisi-
ana law); Delahanty v. Hinkley, 564 A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. App. 1989); Riordan v. Interna-
tional Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (IlM. App. Ct. 1985). But see Kelley v. R.G.
Industries, 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (applying strict liability to manufacture and sale
of Saturday Night Specials).
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equipment, nor any number of manufacturers of seemingly useful
products."s
The same can be said for manufacturers of alcoholic beverages.
Rather than face up to the lethal effect of alcohol, the courts have turned
a blind eye to the plain fact that alcohol kills and maims.4 4 I do not sug-
gest a return to Prohibition (although I believe that communitarian phi-
losophy would have room for such an intrusion on so dubious a liberty as
the "right" to intoxicants); I do suggest, however, that those who profit
from activities involving a foreseeable risk of grave harm should be held
fully accountable. 5 To wink at such conduct as an inevitable cost of liv-
ing in a "civilized" society is to provide a cost-free license for irresponsi-
ble behavior.46
Communitarians might draw a distinction between an outright ban
on the sale of intoxicating beverages, which could be viewed as repressive
moralism, and a rule imposing liability on those whose action in connec-
tion with intoxicants-including manufacture, sale, provision, and con-
sumption-imposes unreasonable risks on others.47 Such a distinction
43. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 653 (lst Cir. 1981)
(oral contraceptive estrogen pill); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 301 (N.J. 1983)
(swimming pool); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982)
(asbestos); Gentile v. MacGregor Mfg. Co., 493 A.2d 647, 648 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985) (football helmet).
A frequently employed argument is that the harm caused by firearms is intended, while
that caused by other products is not. But that argument stands logic on its head. Normally,
we are more, not less, willing to impose liability for intentional harm. During oral argument
of a case I brought (unsuccessfully) against a firearms manufacturer, one judge suggested
that the manufacturer would in fact be liable if the semiautomatic rifle had exploded,
thereby injuring its user (a "malfunction"), but that the manufacturer could not possibly be
liable to those who were deliberately killed when the weapon functioned "properly." This is
an example of mindless application of doctrine in lieu of policy-based logic.
44. See, e.g., Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1986)(en
banc); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Williamson v.
Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1986).
45. Admittedly, problems of proximate cause attend the attachment of such liability.
But these problems are surmountable in light of the foreseeability of the harm invited by
such products. See generally Robert F. Cochran, Jr., "Good Whiskey," Drunk Driving, and
Innocent Bystanders: The Responsibility of Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Hedonic
Products for Bystander Injury, 45 S.C. L. REv. 269 (1994) (elaborating further on imposition
of liability on manufacturers of alcoholic beverages).
46. I am reminded of the response credited to Mahandis Gandhi, when asked what he
thought about western civilization: "I think it would be a good idea." E.F. SCHUMACHER,
GOOD WORK 62 (1979).
47. A visitor from another planet would probably be aghast at our insistence on the
"right" to abuse our livers through the consumption of alcohol, or, for that matter, to abuse
our hearts and lungs through use of tobacco products. Nonetheless, practical politics pre-
cludes an outright ban. The experience of Prohibition instructs us that no amount of regula-
tion will stop some people from making backyard hootch. Instructive, however, is the low
level of resistance to proposals for increased taxation of tobacco and alcohol products, even
during a period of tax revolt. I believe that this may reflect public acceptance of the imposi-
tion of burdens on activities which are, objectively speaking, bad for us. If an outright ban
will not work, perhaps we can tax and "tort" these activities out of existence. As I have
suggested earlier, a strong tinge of eclecticism naturally runs through communitarianism.
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allows freedom of action, but shifts losses resulting from such action to
those with whom responsibility resides. I would be reluctant to shift the
loss among those engaged in such activity, for example, by imposing lia-
bility for an injured drunk driver on the manufacturer or seller of alcohol.
As I will elaborate later on, I do not believe that we should indulge those
who claim a "right" to be protected from their own self-destructive be-
havior.48 I do believe, however, that the law should distinguish between
those who are participants in risk-generating activity and those who are
innocent bystanders. Responsibility means protecting the drunk's victim,
not the drunk.49
By advocating the imposition of liability on people such as social
hosts and firearms manufacturers, I am not suggesting an expansion of
tort liability beyond normal limits. Rather, I am suggesting a rounding
out of liability to comport with the general duty of care, as well as an end
to special immunities for which no defensible rationale is available. Pro-
fessor James Henderson has written (quite convincingly, I believe) that
we should be wary of efforts to "purify" the negligence concept by doing
away with rules of law in favor of the general standard of "reasonable
care under the circumstances." 50 Professor Henderson fears, with some
justification, that in at least some cases, the substitution of this rather
amorphous general standard for hard and fast rules leaves juries without
sufficient guidance to make fair, rational decisions.
Professor Henderson's solution, however, is to invoke legal rules that
create special spheres of undeserved protection for wrongdoers. For ex-
ample, Professor Henderson proposes that conformity with industry stan-
dards serve as a defense to products liability claims,5 1 despite our
longtime realization that such a rule creates a self-servingly low standard
that will not advance the safety of the public.52 Although well-defined
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of the "right" to protection from one's own self-destructive behav-
ior, see infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
49. I am aware of the scientific view that alcoholism is a disease. But not all drunks
are alcoholics, and even those who are should be relieved of responsibility no more than the
inherently clumsy or dull-witted individual. See OLrVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 108-09 (1948). We need a baseline of acceptable conduct that overrides the "everyone's
a victim" philosophy that has become so popular of late.
50. Henderson, Expanding Negligence, supra note 30, at 478.
51. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1556-57 (1973) [hereinafter
Henderson, Judicial Review].
52. "[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and avail-
able devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages." The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). This
rule regarding conformity to industry standards has also been applied in strict liabilty cases.
See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979) (design of gun), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894; Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Neb. 1979) (design of
truck bumper).
Alternatively, Professor Henderson suggests that conformity with government regula-
tion could be the last word in products cases. This principle, however, is viable only if we
19951
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
standards work to everybody's benefit, absurdly low standards, which
amount to immunities, rarely do. To the extent that we value the negli-
gence principle, either because of its deterrent effect or as a statement of
morality, that principle should work to hold persons accountable for their
conduct. To grant special exceptions without an adequate rationale un-
dermines the legitimacy of the entire system.
2. Expanding the negligence concept through imposition of addi-
tional duties
Several commentators have suggested expanding the law of negli-
gence to include an affirmative duty to render aid to those in peril, if such
assistance can be provided at little risk to oneself.53 While such a duty
would be at odds with the traditional absence of liability for nonfeasance,
it would appeal to "[p]ersons who are interested generally in emphasizing
the responsibility side of the rights coin."' 4 Indeed, most of us are ap-
palled when bystanders fail to perform such a minor task as summoning
help for victims of accidents or crimes.55 The question remains, however,
whether the moral imperative to render assistance should give rise to a
legal rule that imposes civil or criminal liability for its violation through
would want administrative regulation of product safety to be so pervasive as to fully occupy
the field. See Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 51, at 1574-78. Thankfully, this is not
the law. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir. 1993)
(state law claims against aircraft manufacturer not preempted on ground that Federal Avia-
tion Administration had approved airplane's design).
53. See Glendon, Good Samaritan, supra note 6, at 10; Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's
Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 33 (1988); Kent W. Feuerhehn,
Taking Notice of Good Samaritan and Duty to Rescue Laws, 11 J. CONTEIP. L. 219, 230
(1984); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27
Mxcn. J.L. & REFORM. 439, 517-19 (1994); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to
Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REv. 673 (1994); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the
Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV.
879, 881 (1986); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 292
(1980); A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1273, 1299-1300 (1983); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder
to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 8-9 (1993).
Four states-Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin-have Good Samari-
tan statutes creating an affirmative duty to rescue. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West
Supp. 1995); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.34(2) (West Supp. 1994). Rhode Island and Wisconsin, along with five other
states, have statutes punishing failure to report serious crimes. See RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-
3.1 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2) (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West
1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115 (1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1992);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (Anderson Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.69.100, 9.92.020 (West 1988).
54. Glendon, Good Samaritan, supra note 6, at 9.
55. A prime example of this phenomenon is the March 13, 1964 attack on Kitty Geno-
vese, a New York woman who was repeatedly and fatally stabbed as her screams were heard
by thirty-eight neighbors. The failure of Ms. Genovese's neighbors to even lift a telephone
to summon police evoked widespread expressions of shock and criticism. Beth Holland, Her
Cries Recall Another Murder, NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1989, at 3.
[Vol. 30
TORT LAW
inaction."
Opponents of such a rule have attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween law and morality, claiming: "With purely moral obligations the law
does not deal."57 But it is absurd to suggest that the law bears no rela-
tionship to morality. Consider, for example, the law pertaining to the mil-
itary draft, a measure which has required a significant compromise of
individual liberty in order to promote the general welfare.58 The draft
could be viewed simply as a matter of practical necessity, a utilitarian
measure necessary to preserve the community against outside threats.
But the manner in which we have gone about imposing the draft is im-
bued with moral considerations. For example, we ceased to allow wealthy
people to purchase a substitute, recognizing that shared sacrifice is mor-
ally necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness.6 " We have allowed
people to perform alternative service if their religious beliefs precluded
their participation in warfare.6 0 Even the draft lottery, and the random
selection it generated, was based on the fairness principle. Morality plays
a role here, as it continues to play a role in countless other legal rules.
Who can deny that the criminalization of murder, along with different
levels of culpability based on the defendant's state of mind, is morally
grounded? The fault principle in tort law, while supported by practical
and economic considerations, also finds a basis in morality.6' Clearly, the
law is a reflection of our moral principles, and we should be neither
ashamed nor embarrassed by this fact.
It is equally clear, however, that legal rules alone do not and cannot
fully define the moral universe. Although I disagree with Professor Rich-
ard Epstein's assertion that an act loses its moral value when compelled62
56. Professor Glendon differentiates between rules imposing tort and criminal liability
for failure to rescue. Glendon, Good Samaritan, supra note 6, at 11. I doubt that it makes
much difference, as a matter of policy or moral suasion. To the extent enforcement is
deemed important, however, it is more likely to be obtained through private tort actions
than through public prosecutions, given the demands on most district attorneys' offices.
57. Buch v. Armory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1897).
58. "[I]n a free society the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces
and the reserve components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a system
of selection which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effec-
tive national economy. 50 App. U.S.C. § 451(c) (1988) (empowering Congress to reinstate
the draft).
59. There remains concern that an all volunteer army, instituted in lieu of the draft,
would result in a poor man's army. The All-Volunteer Armed Force: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed Forces, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1977) (statement of Professor William R. King) (indicating a disproportionate
amount of lower income groups and minorities enlisted); Thomas J. Bradley, The All Vol-
unteer Force, Conscription, and Other Alternatives, 7 J. LEGIS. 125, 130, 138 (1980) (sug-
gesting that an all-volunteer army is inequitable, as it involves disproportionate numbers of
poor, uneducated, and minority enlistees).
60. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j) (1988).
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
62. Professor Epstein states:
One line of moral thought emphasizes the importance of freedom of the will. It
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(is it amoral to pay one's taxes?), certainly morality dictates that we do
many things that are not legally required of us. Unfortunately, as Profes-
sor Glendon has lamented, the public "incorrigibly refuses to draw as
neat a line between law and morality as lawyers have been taught to
do."63 The tendency on the part of the public to equate law with morality,
to assume that if something is not illegal then it is not immoral, may
suggest the practical need for a rule requiring rescue in situations in
which the potential rescuer is not in peril.6 4 Compared to the perils con-
nected with the military draft, it does not seem especially cnerous to de-
mand that citizens call the police when they see a neighbor being
attacked, toss a life preserver to a drowning swimmer, or render first aid
during a medical emergency if they are equipped to do so. A rule impos-
ing tort liability on those unwilling to do so may be a small price to pay
for life in a society in which one cannot help but obtain support from
one's fellow citizens.6 5
There remain, however, legitimate objections to such a rule. There is,
for one thing, the problem of defining the limits of our public obligation.
Professor Richard Epstein furnishes the example of the charitable solici-
tation in which the relatively comfortable citizen is asked to contribute
but ten dollars to save the life of a starving child. 6 The contribution
would work no hardship upon the citizen, and would appear to be a rea-
sonable thing to do. But should it be compelled? "Where tests of 'reason-
ableness'-stated with such confidence and applied with such
difficulty-dominate the law of tort, it becomes impossible to tell where
liberty ends and obligation begins; where contract ends, and tort be-
gins. '67 I am not nearly so disturbed as some conservative political lead-
ers are about preserving the "purity" of individual charity. I do, however,
share Professor Epstein's concern regarding the boundary between public
obligation and private choice.
It is not altogether clear that communitarianism requires government
compulsion, through legal rules or otherwise, to encourage people to play
an affirmative role for the good of the community. Those calling for less
government intrusion into peoples' lives might best lead by example.68
is the intention (or motive) that determines the worth of the act; and no act can
be moral unless it is performed free from external compulsion. Hence the expan-
sion of the scope of positive law could only reduce the moral worth of human
action.
Id. at 200.
63. Glendon, Good Samaritan, supra note 6, at 11.
64. I do not rule out the need to educate the public, and in particular, political and
corporate leaders, regarding the inadequacy of the law as a substitute for individual moral
judgment. We cannot go around legislating every moral imperative; sometimes people
should be obligated to do more than use law as a moral crutch.
65. For example, even the most ardent libertarian benefits from public highways, the
national defense, police protection, and the public education of the young, among other
things.
66. Epstein, supra note 61, at 199.
67. Id.
68. An example which immediately comes to mind is that of a former President,
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Perhaps public debate over the need for a Good Samaritan rule will spur
a greater sense of public obligation, and ultimately eliminate the need for
such a legal rule.6 9
3. Protecting whistleblowers
Communitarian ideals would be greatly advanced through increased
tort protection for government and corporate whistleblowers. Presently,
employees who report wrongdoing on the part of their employers receive
surprisingly little protection.7 ° Actions for wrongful discharge-the com-
mon law cause of action on behalf of persons unfairly discharged from
employment-tend to be treated under narrow exceptions to the general
doctrine of employment at will. 1 Where whistleblower protection statutes
have been enacted, coverage typically has been limited to public employ-
ees. Only whistleblowing of a very narrow sort tends to be protected;
under several statutes, there must be a clear statutory violation by the
employer.7 3 Moreover, most states protect whistleblowers only where the
exposed violation presents a substantial and specific danger to public
health and safety.74
Federal protections for whistleblowers are riddled with exceptions. In
some instances, the federal statutes preempt other remedies, thereby de-
priving whistleblowers of common law causes of action.7 5 Substantial
Jimmy Carter, whose contributions to the community since leaving office have come to
eclipse his record in the White House. Other politicians lecture to us about the virtue of
private charity; Jimmy Carter demonstrates it on a regular basis. See, e.g., L.A. Watch; Aid
Thriller, LA. TIEs, Jan. 28, 1993, at B6.
69. This effect will be produced only if the debate spills beyond the scholarly journals
and into the public consciousness through Larry King Live, Oprah, and other crucibles of
public opinion.
70. See generally Thomas M. Devine and Donald G. Alpin, Whistleblower Protec-
tion-The Gap Between the Law and Reality, 31 How. L.J. 223 (1988) (describing the
hollow benefit of whistleblower protection laws); Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 355 (1991) (ex-
plaining that the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 has failed to provide the intended
level of security for whistleblowers).
71. The courts of thirty-nine states have recognized a common law public policy ex-
ception to employment at will. Susan Sauter, The Employee Health and Safety
Whistleblower Protection Act and the Conscientious Employee: The Potential for Federal
Statutory Enforcement of the Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will, 59 U. CIN.
L. REv. 513, 517 n.21 (1990). The exception is frequently quite limited, generally only pro-
tecting whistleblowers only where there is a "clear mandate of public policy" to do so. See,
e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974).
72. Of the thirty-three states with statutes protecting whistleblowers, only fifteen ex-
tend that protection to the private sector. Tim Barnett, Overview of State Whistleblower
Protection Statutes, 43 LAB. L.J. 440, 442 (1992).
73. HAw. REv. STAT. § 621-10.5 (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1989); MIcH. Comop.
LAWS § 15.362 (1993) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1989)); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181.932 (West 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3 (1994);
TE L LAB. CODE ANN. § 411.082 (West 1995); Tvx Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 554.002 (West 1995).
74. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(2) (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988).
75. See, e.g., Cox v. Radiology Consulting Assoc., 658 F. Supp. 264, 266 (W.D. Pa.
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problems in proving causation-including proof that whistleblowing was
the cause of the employee's dismissal, demotion, or failure to obtain pro-
motion-make federal and state causes of action very difficult to pursue.70
Finally, statutes of limitations for these causes of action tend to be quite
short.7
If we wish to encourage more responsible citizenship, we should give
more than lip service to whistleblower protection. An employee who ex-
poses an employer's malfeasance, in order to protect a public interest,
should be able to do so with assurance of legal protection. Communitari-
anism demands effective participation, not martyrdom, from our citizens.
On the other side of the coin, the "right" of an employer to have a free
hand with respect to personnel matters should not include a "right" to
terminate or otherwise discriminate against an employee who acts in the
public interest to expose employer wrongdoing. An employer's "right" to
act freely with respect to personnel matters is already compromised by
statutes prohibiting discrimination on account of race, sex, age, and disa-
bility. 8 Communitarian principles should afford the same type of protec-
tion to employee efforts in furtherance of important public interests. I
suggest a rounding out of statutory and common law liability to provide
meaningful, comprehensive protection for employees in both the public
and private sectors.
B. Situations in Which Communitarian Principles Might Suggest a
Limitation or Contraction of Tort Liability
1. Slapping down SLAPP suits
An additional means of advancing the communitarian ideal of pro-
moting effective citizen participation in the public interest is the eradica-
tion of SLAPP suits. SLAPP suits, or Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation, are actions brought against citizens or citizens' groups in
order to stifle political debate over a particular issue. SLAPPs may be
filed by real estate developers, polluters, or even government agencies. 0
The pattern is fairly consistent: A group of citizens mounts a grass-roots
campaign over an issue of local concern, such as the proposed develop-
ment of local property. The target of their campaign, frustrated by the
interference, files a multimillion dollar"' lawsuit against the citizens alleg-
1987). A few state statutes similarly preempt common law tort remedies. See, e.g., OhIsen v.
DST Industries, Inc., 314 N.W.2d 699, 701-02 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Davis v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 288 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Minn. 1979); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 563 P.2d
1205, 1208-09 (Or. 1977).
76. Fisher, supra note 70, at 362.
77. Half of the states with whistleblower statutes in force have a statute of limitations
of one year or less, with some as short as thirty days. Barnett, supra note 72, at 445.
78. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Supp. I 1994).
79. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. 23, 26 (1989).
80. On average, SLAPP suits demand nine million dollars in damages. Id. at 23.
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ing defamation, interference with business relations, or some similar tort
theory."' The target of the SLAPP finds its resources diverted from the
original battle to a defense of the SLAPP, and both the target and those
who hear of the suit learn a chilling lesson on the dangers of involvement
in public debate.
The bitter irony of SLAPPs is that while most fail on the merits,82
even the unsuccessful lawsuits can nonetheless achieve their underlying
goal. SLAPP plaintiffs are motivated not so much by the expectation of
collecting large damage awards as by strategic goals, such as retaliation
for political frustration, prevention of future opposition, or intimidation
of political opponents.8 3 On average, a SLAPP does not achieve ultimate
disposition until thirty-six months after it has been brought8 4 and can
cost the target thousands of dollars in legal fees.8 5 A SLAPP can succeed,
therefore, in discouraging both the target and other members of the pub-
lic from continued opposition to the plaintiffs plans.
It is this chilling effect on public debate which is most alarming to
those who see value in encouraging greater public participation in the po-
litical process. 8  The goals of SLAPP suits run directly counter to the
First Amendment's Petition Clause,87 to numerous state constitutions and
statutes,8 and to our desire as a democratic society to encourage debate
over issues of public concern. Communitarian principles would therefore
be advanced by limiting the chilling effect of SLAPPs on free speech and
public debate.
Since the goal of SLAPPs is to involve the target in lengthy, expen-
sive litigation, they are best frustrated by speedy disposition. Because
81. For an analysis of the tort actions used as substantive bases for SLAPP suits, see
George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 3, 9 (1989).
82. Defendants ultimately prevail in over 77% of SLAPPs. Id. at 12.
83. Canan, supra note 79, at 30. See also Pring, supra note 81, at 5-6 (discussing the
goals of SLAPPs to punish opponents and impose a price for community activism).
84. Canan, supra note 79, at 26.
85. Laura J. Ericson-Siegel, Comment, Silencing SLAPPs: An Examination of Pro-
posed Legislative Remedies and a "Solution" for Florida, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 494
(1992).
"Loser pays" legislation now being considered by Congress is unlikely to seriously deter
SLAPP suits. The most recent version of this legislation requires the tendering of a settle-
ment offer before a party is entitled to attorneys' fees. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). SLAPP defendants may lack the means to make a substantial offer, or may refuse to
do so on the basis of principle. In addition, the prospect of payment of citizens' attorneys'
fees may be an inadequate deterrent to a well-heeled corporation attempting to advance a
multimillion dollar project.
86. For a discussion of the centrality of public political participation to communitar-
ian ideals, see ETz!oNi, supra note 1, at 226-27.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom ... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
88. See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Par-
ticipation ("SLAPPs"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L.
RFv. 937, 945 n.20 (1992).
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courts must take the plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of a mo-
tion to dismiss, however, it can be difficult to get a SLAPP dismissed
solely on the pleadings. A hesitancy on the part of judges to impose sanc-
tions under Federal Rule 11 and similar state provisions,8 9 and the insuf-
ficiency in the size of those sanctions which are imposed,9 0 may allow
SLAPP plaintiffs to persist in contriving pleadings that preserve a cause
of action.
Three leading authorities on SLAPPs9 1 advocate widespread adop-
tion of the approach taken by the Colorado Supreme Court in Protect
Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME)9 2 Under the
POME approach, the Petition Clause is used to place a heavy burden on
a SLAPP plaintiff facing a motion to dismiss.93 Similarly, other states
have devised statutory schemes to discourage SLAPPs.9' So long as they
89. Jennifer E. Sills, Comment, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participa-
tion): How Can the Legal System Eliminate their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 547, 574 (1993)
(citing SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EhipmcAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 4 (1985)). The frequent
application of sanctions in civil rights cases does not appear to be replicated in environmen-
tal litigation. See Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 429, 434-35 (1992).
90. There is a very real concern that the sanctions awarded under Rule 11 may be
small enough that SLAPP filers can regard them as part of the expense of the SLAPP,
rather than as a deterrent. See Mark A. Chertok, Sanctions as a SLAPP Deterrent: How
Effective Are They?, in SLAPPs: STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
GOVERNMENT, C935 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 117, 148-150 (1994). The largest reported sanction for a
SLAPP to date is $20,000. Id. at 150.
91. See Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 33, 42 (1989); Pring, supra note 81, at 18-19; Pring & Canan, supra note 88,
at 951-53.
92. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
93. Under the POME standard, a motion to dismiss by reason of the constitutional
right to petition is treated as one for summary judgment, enabling the parties to present all
material pertinent to the motion. Thereafter,
the plaintiff must make a sufficient showing to permit the court to reasonably
conclude that the defendant's petitioning activities were not immunized from
liability under the First Amendment because: (1) the defendant's administrative
or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual support, or if so supportable,
lacked any cognizable basis in law for their assertion; and (2) the primary pur-
pose of the defendant's petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effec-
tuate some other improper objective; and (3) the defendant's petitioning activity
had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.
Id.
94. See generally Geoffrey Paul Huling, Note, Tired of Being Slapped Around: States
Take Action Against Lawsuits Designed to Intimidate & Harass, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 401
(1994) (discussing judicial, legislative, and strategic tactics to combat SLAPPs).
Washington's anti-SLAPP statute essentially codifies the First Amendment petition
privilege, immunizing from civil suit any good faith communication to a public body regard-
ing issues of public concern. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (1995). Under the statute, Wash-
ington requires the agency to which the communication was made to provide the target with
counsel in defending the SLAPP. Id. § 4.24.520.
A number of other states have passed statutes taking a more moderate approach to
discouraging SLAPPs. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 1994); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.
& R. 3211(g), 3212(h), 3403 (McKinney 1995); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 76-a (McKinney
1995); RLI GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-2 to -3 (1994).
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do not stifle legitimate litigation, such statutes, together with effective
whistleblower protection legislation, should promote the communitarian
goal of greater citizen participation in the creation and enforcement of
public policy.
2. Limiting liability for emotional harm
Sometimes too great a burden is imposed on the legal system by ef-
forts to compensate for harms which, while genuine, are not amenable to
legal redress. Courts have long wrestled with the issue of whether to
award damages for emotional distress. These damages are typically
awarded as a matter of course in cases involving physical harm; the plain-
tiff's "pain and suffering" is viewed as another element of damages.9 5
This element tends to result not only in inflated verdicts, but in gross
disparities between verdicts for similar injuries, because damages of this
type elude objective quantification. Placing caps on these damages, as
some state legislatures have done,97 might restore a measure of sanity to
the "tort lottery" and diminish the role of tort litigation as a cottage in-
dustry for those who view it not just as a means of obtaining compensa-
tion for injury, but as a chance for the big score.
The major legal issue addressed by the courts, however, has been
whether to award damages for emotional distress resulting from negligent
conduct when such distress is unaccompanied by physical harm. Fearing
trumped-up, fraudulent claims, but recognizing that emotional distress
can nevertheless be a serious, genuine injury, the courts have imposed
various hurdles that plaintiffs must overcome in order to recover for such
injuries. First came the impact rule-a requirement that the plaintiff
must have suffered some physical impact in order to recover for emo-
tional distress. 8 That rule proved to be both overinclusive and underin-
95. KEETON Er AL., supra note 31, § 54, at 362-63.
96. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Us-
ing Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DuKE L.J. 879, 892 (1994); W.
Kip Viscus, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or
Capricious Awards?, 8 Ir'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203-04 (1988).
97. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1994) ($250,000 limit on non-economic
losses in cases brought against health care providers); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5
(West 1994) ($250,000 cap on non-economic damages absent clear and convincing evidence;
but in no case may such damages exceed $500,000); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-
108 (1995) ($350,000 cap on non-economic losses; $500,000 after October 1, 1994); cap in-
creases by $15,000 each October 1 thereafter); see also Medical Malpractice Fairness Act,
H.R. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (establishing national standards for the resolution of
medical malpractice claims, and limiting total amount of non-economic damages).
98. E.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680, 681 (Ga. App. 1928) (emotional
distress caused by horse voiding in plaintiff's lap), overruled by OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany
v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146, 148 (Ga. 1989). In an unreported case, a Tennessee woman
recovered $2,000 after a soda bottle exploded in her hand. Victim of Nightmares Gets
$2,000 Judgment, N.Y. TiaiEs, Sept. 18, 1980, at A20. Her psychiatrist testified that the
plaintiff had suffered recurring nightmares of giant bottles chasing her since a 32-ounce
Coca-Cola container exploded in her hand. Id.
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clusive, 9 and therefore was abandoned by most courts in favor of a rule
requiring that the plaintiff be in the zone of physical danger in order to
recover for emotional distress.10 0
Courts were then confronted by a series of bystander cases, in which
close relatives of accident victims, who were not themselves in peril but
who experienced shock upon seeing their loved ones maimed or killed,
brought actions for their emotional distress. Many courts extended recov-
ery to these plaintiffs, this time subjecting them to a series of guidelines
to determine whether the distress was genuine and worthy of redress. 10 1
Even this proved insufficient, however, when courts were asked to con-
sider cases in which plaintiffs sustained no physical impact, suffered no
physical manifestations of the emotional distress, and witnessed no acci-
dent, but nevertheless suffered emotional harm caused by the negligence
of the defendant. The California Supreme Court faced this issue in
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.102 In that case, a physician and
health maintenance organization were sued after the physician had incor-
rectly diagnosed not the plaintiff, but the plaintiff's wife, as carrying a
99. The rule was overinclusive in that it allowed recovery for all sorts of emotional
distress once there was proof of the most trivial impact. For a discussion of the types of
physical impact required to recover for emotional distress, see supra note 98 and accompa-
nying text. The rule was underinclusive in that many cases of serious emotional distress
went uncompensated in the absence of impact. E.g., James v. Harris, 729 P.2d 986, 988
(Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (parents denied recovery after seeing their child run over by a car);
Woodman v. Dever, 367 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (child denied recovery
after witnessing robbery and sexual assault upon her mother).
100. E.g., Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d 80, 82 (Cal. 1957) (to recover for injury, plaintiff
must fear detriment to own safety); Cook v. Maler, 92 P.2d 434, 436 (Cal. 1939) ("fright
must be accompanied by fear of immediate personal injury, and physical injury must
occur").
A variation on this theme involves cases in which the plaintiff was exposed to danger,
and thereafter feared contracting some dreaded disease. For example, in Johnson v. West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (W. Va. 1991), a security guard was bit by
an unruly patient who was infected with AIDS. The guard, who never developed AIDS,
nevertheless was allowed to recover for "post traumatic stress disorder" because he had
been exposed to the disease. Id. at 897; see also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 817 (Cal. 1993) (recovery for fear of developing cancer allowed if toxic exposure
that caused fear was result of oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct); Ayers v.
Macoughtry, 117 P. 1088, 1090 (Okla. 1911) (recovery allowed for dogbite resulting in fear of
rabies).
101. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968); see also Sinn v. Burd, 404
A.2d 672, 686 (Pa. 1979) (holding that recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress
should be granted when such distress is reasonably foreseeable even if the plaintiff was
outside the zone of danger). Contra Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684
(N.D. 1972) (holding mother could not recover for emotional damages caused by seeing a
hospital employee drop her baby because she was not within the zone of danger). The guide-
lines for recovery under Dillon were turned into conditions precedent to recovery in Thing
v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989), thereby making recovery more difficult.
Most emotional distress cases involve a sudden, catastrophic event, such as an automo-
bile accident. However, in Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1280 (N.J. 1993), parents were
allowed to recover for emotional distress caused by medical malpractice resulting in the
premature birth and death of their child.
102. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
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venereal disease.10 3 As might be expected, the patient/wife confronted the
plaintiff/husband with this information, and things went from bad to
worse, tearing the marriage asunder.10 4 The husband subsequently sued
for the emotional distress resulting from the breakup of his marriage.10 5
The Molien court devoted most of its opinion to a discussion of
whether a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress in the absence of
any physical manifestations. 06 Noting that a requirement of physical
manifestations had often led to distorted pleading, and recognizing that
virtually every emotional response has some physical counterpart, how-
ever minute, the court decided that the absence of physical manifesta-
tions should not pose an artificial barrier to recovery. 0 7 "[T]he jurors are
best situated to determine whether and to what extent the defendant's
conduct caused emotional distress, by referring to their own experi-
ence."108 Theoretically, the court's language is appealing. Unfortunately,
however, jurors do not possess a magic divining rod to distinguish genuine
claims from bogus ones, or to place an accurate value on such injuries,
however real. Professor Henderson's admonition regarding the need for
objective rules to direct the jury in its decisionmaking'019 may be particu-
larly well-advised in cases such as Molen. Requiring that the plaintiff
suffer from objectively determined physical manifestations of his emo-
tional distress would deny recovery to relatively few worthy plaintiffs.
Moreover, such a requirement would relieve courts, juries, and defendants
of the burden of cases involving speculative decisionmaking and defenses
that amount to shadow-boxing.
The Molien court also considered the issue of duty, and decided that
the doctor could, in fact, be found to owe a duty to a person who was not
his patient, so long as the injury was foreseeable." 0 That is fair enough.
Were a doctor negligently to diagnose her patient as being free from any
venereal disease, and as a consequence the patient's spouse were to suffer
physical harm, we would not have too much difficulty tracing the respon-
sibility for such harm back to the doctor.11 The problem in Molien is
that the plaintiff was asking for damages for emotional distress allegedly
caused by the dissolution of his marriage, which in turn was allegedly
caused by the doctor's erroneous diagnosis." 2 To ask a court and jury to
pinpoint, with any degree of accuracy, the cause of a marital breakup is to
invite judicial involvement in intimate and complex human relationships
103. Id. at 814.
104. Id. at 815.
105. Id.
06. Id. at 818-21.
107. Id. at 820.
108. Id. at 821.
109. Henderson, Expanding Negligence, supra note 30, at 469-77.
110. Molien, 616 P.2d at 817.
111. Indeed, to state that the doctor had "no duty" to the patient's spouse would con-
fer the same immunity for foreseeable harm that I complained about earlier in the context
of social hosts. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
112. Molien, 616 P.2d at 814-15.
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to a disturbing degree.113
The law's tendency, of late, has been in the opposite direction, and
for good reason. The Griswold privacy decision, 1 4 the enactment of no-
fault divorce laws,11 5 and the elimination of "heart-balm" actions for
breach of promise to marry, seduction, alienation of affections, and crimi-
nal conversation 16 have all been designed to get the courts out of our
bedrooms, and to reserve judicial scrutiny for matters that the courts are
more capable of determining and which are more appropriate to a public
forum.
The area of emotional distress, with its fabricated pleadings and
speculative damages, is an appropriate area in which to invoke Professor
Etzioni's call for a moratorium on the minting of new "rights.' ' 17 Never-
theless, lawyers and scholars are busy at work, like the Hydra monster,
finding new injuries to redress and new causes of action to invoke. Not
long ago, Professor Jane E. Larson published an article in which she sug-
gested the creation of a new tort of sexual fraud."" Professor Larson pro-
posed the following addition to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention, or law, for the purpose of inducing another to consent to sex-
ual relations in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in
deceit for serious physical, pecuniary and emotional loss caused to the
recipient by his or her justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation. 119
To be sure, Professor Larson is sincere in her effort to redress the
age-old problem of deceit and seduction. Some of the harms she de-
113. I suspect that the Moliens' marriage was not made in heaven. Even if it was, to
pinpoint the erroneous diagnosis as a proximate cause of the harm and saddle the physician
and HMO with damages for all of the attendant emotional distress strains our notions of
responsibility under tort law. To those who suggest a role for comparative negligence, I
would ask, "Compared to what? To the negligence of husband or wife, whose fault is
deemed immaterial under our no-fault divorce laws?" See CAL. FAm. CODE § 2310 (West
1994) (listing two grounds for dissolution of marriage: (1) "[i]rreconcilable differences, which
have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage" and (2) "[i]ncurable insanity");
id. § 2311 (defining "irreconcilable differences"); id. § 2312 (defining "incurable insanity").
114. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing that a right to privacy
under the Constitution protected the purchase and use of contraceptives by married adults).
115. E.g., CAL. FAn CODE § 2310 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1601 (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (1991).
116. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 771.01-771.03 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.02
(West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23.-1 (West 1987). See generally Jeffrey D. Kobar, Note,
Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1770 (1985) (discussing the im-
pact of "heart-balm" statutes that abolished many of these causes of action).
Justice Clark, dissenting in Molien, pointed out that California bad, several years ear-
lier, statutorily eliminated the tort of intentional alienation of affections; by allowing Mr.
Molien's case to go forward the state was now, in effect, recognizing a cause of action for
negligent alienation of affections. Molien, 616 P.2d at 825 n.3.
117. ETZmoNI, supra note 1, at 5.
118. Jane E. Larson, Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature "De-
ceit". A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. Rzv. 374, 453 (1993).
119. Id.
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scribes-for example, physical harm from the failure to disclose a sexu-
ally transmitted disease-are quite real, quite tangible, and already
actionable without benefit of a new Restatement section.120 There are
some areas, however, even areas in which wrongdoing persists, in which
we are better off leaving things in bad shape for fear of tinkering them
into worse shape. The same politically correct people who cringe at Bor-
kian critiques of the Griswold decision 2' would now invite the courts
under our bedsheets in order to recognize yet another cause of action. 122
There exists in the academic community an urge"2 3 to find a remedy for
every wrong, while leaving to courts and juries the difficult and sometimes
impossible task of sorting out the evidence and determining appropriate
damages. I do not mean to belittle the harm that can result from sexual
betrayal. We must, however, recognize the limitations of judicial re-
dress."24 As The New Yorker comments,
120. E.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (imposing duty on one
who knows or should know that he or she is infected with genital herpes to either abstain
from sexual conduct with others or to warn others of infection prior to having contact;
breach of this duty gives rise to cause of action for tortious transmission of disease); Gabriel
v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing causes of action for
negligence based upon violation of statute making it first-degree misdemeanor to transmit
sexually transmissible disease); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing unmarried person who contracts genital herpes from unmarried sexual partner to
recover damages under negligence theory); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1179-84 (Md. 1988)
(recognizing cause of action for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or negli-
gence resulting from sexual transmission of dangerous, contagious and incurable disease);
S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986) (holding that spousal immunity is not a
bar to action in negligently transmitting sexual disease); Cowell v. Cowell, 105 S.E. 206, 210
(N.C. 1920) (allowing wife to maintain action against husband for infection with venereal
disease); DeVall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 246-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (allowing cause of
action based on allegations that plaintiff consented to intercourse under promise to marry,
and was thereby infected). See generally Robert A. Prentice & Paula C. Murray, Liability
for Transmission of Herpes: Using Traditional Tort Principles to Encourage Honesty in
Sexual Relationships, 11 J. CoNTEMP. L. 67 (1984) (providing a historical overview of tort
liability for the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases).
121. See ROBERT H. BORK, TmH TEMPTING OF AMERICA THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 95-100 (1990).
122. The New Yorker, in a quick take on Professor Larson's article, forecasts that if
the language of the proposed Restatement section is taken literally, the courts will be enter-
taining actions
for the distress caused by counter-promissory seismic stasis (he told her the
earth would move and it didn't); reckless parental-nonreturn assurances (her
parents showed up two hours earlier than she told him they would); breach of
natal-site removal contract (he said he would take her away from this two-bit
burg and didn't); and lunar nondelivery (she promised him the moon and never
came across).
Empty Suits, THE NEW YORKER, July 12, 1993, at 6.
123. Id. The New Yorker calls this an "Erehwonian yearning," referring to Samuel
Butler's utopian novel Erehwon. Id.
124. Professor Larson states, "The . . . premise of my proposal is that trust rather
than deceit should be nurtured as the ground for sexual relationships, and that mutuality
and reciprocity are 'the rules' by which sexual partners should play." Larson, supra note
118, at 465. I quite agree. I do not agree, however, that trust in such intimate relationships
is nurtured through judicial action, rather than moral development and social prodding.
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[W]hile it's true that reason, as represented by the law, can often re-
dress wrongs and chastise wrongdoers, we won't ever be able to take
human nature to court, as we seem to want to, in our increasingly fre-
quent, increasingly righteous, and sometimes increasingly daffy resort
to litigation. The ultimate defendants--God, fate, evolution, or simply
our innermost selves-are beyond the reach of the process servers. 125
De corde non curat lex.1 2 6
3. "Protect me from myself" cases
The widespread perception that tort liability has run amuck has pro-
duced many cries for a limitation on tort duties. To some extent, this
perception is unjustified, and stems from "man bites dog" cases-the odd
cases that attract public attention because they are the exception to the
rule. 127 A prominent example is the $2.9 million verdict awarded in 1994
Indeed, Professor Larson's frequent resort to "literature, opera, popular culture, history,
philosophy, and political theory" to support her thesis may suggest that her moral ideal is
best advanced through non-judicial mechanisms. See id. at 472.
125. Empty Suits, supra note 122, at 6.
126. This Latin phrase roughly translates as: "The law does not deal with affairs of
the heart."
127. Empiricists have debated the contention that litigiousness is an essential part of
our national character. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 55-56 (1983). A recent study indicates that, contrary
to popular perception, there was no nationwide increase in the filing of tort claims from
1986 to 1992 (the most recent year covered). BRIAN J. OSTROM Er AL., STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992 16 (1994). In 1989, 447,374 tort cases were filed, which is
less than half of 1% of all cases filed in state courts. Roxanne Barton Conlin, Litigation
Explosion Disputed, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1991, at 26. That small percentage includes every
auto collision that resulted in litigation. Id.
I believe that the greater problem lies not so much in a profusion of litigation, but in
the grossly inflated damages that have, of late, attached to that litigation. The first jury
award in excess of one million dollars occurred in 1962. Miles J. Zremshi & David J.
Schwartz, Commentary: Finding Fault With "No Fault", 36 CASE IV. RES. L. REV. 1107,
1109 n.6 (1986). In 1984, there were 401 jury awards above the million dollar mark. Id. at
1107 n.1. Between 1962 and 1970, there were twenty-seven separate million-dollar verdicts
in personal injury cases. Pamela Buck Fort et. al., Florida's Tort Reform: Response to a
Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 541 (1986). Between 1970 and 1977, that
number had grown to 224, and there were 251 such verdicts in 1982 alone. From 1975 to
1984, the average size of products liability jury awards grew from $393,580 to $1,850,452 (a
370% increase). ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AF-
FORDABILITY 36, 39 (1986).
Recent reports suggest moderation in the growth of jury awards. See Richard Perez-
Pena, U.S. Juries Grow Tougher on Those Seeking Damages, N.Y. TIMiES, June 17, 1994, at
Al (citing statistics indicating that the average personal injury award has remained constant
in the early 1990s).
For further illustration, see Marie Reubi & Jill Foster, Current Award Trends in Per-
sonal Injury, JURY VERDIcT RESEARCH SERIES 1.20.0 (1994). The study traces jury verdicts
from 1989 to 1993, and the statistics show that huge awards remain exceptional. For exam-
ple, in 1993, 57% of jury verdicts involved awards of $100,000 or less, 20% of the verdicts
involved awards between $100,000 and $400,000, and fewer than 15% involved awards of
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to a woman who had spilled hot McDonald's coffee on her lap. The initial
jury award was widely reported and criticized, and even used to demon-
strate the need for tort-reform measures proposed by Republicans in
Congress.' 28  The court's subsequent remittitur, reducing damages to
$480,000, went virtually unnoticed.129
I believe, however, that there are two classes of cases in which liabil-
ity is too often imposed, with consequences that should be objectionable
to communitarians. The first class involves those cases in which the plain-
tiff demands that the defendant "protect me from myself." Some obvi-
ously silly cases fall into this category. For example, one man sued the
Purolator company for its negligence in allowing a sack of cash to fall out
of an armored truck, resulting in the plaintiff's appropriating the cash to
his own use and, ultimately, his conviction for a crime.130 In another case,
a man's estate sued the owner of a parking lot, the inadequate security of
which enabled the plaintiff's decedent to steal a car which he subse-
quently crashed, killing himself.131 Because these cases were quickly dis-
missed, I regard them as less serious than those brought by adult
trespassers against the owners of premises which had not been rendered
safe for their use,132 or by drunks against social hosts and others for the
consequences of their own intoxication,133 or by non-users of seat belts
$1,000,000 or more. Id. at 3.
128. E.g., Nancy Mathis, House OKs Limits to Civil Suit Damages, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 11, 1995, at Al (discussing the "Contract with America" as an approach to ending
"excessive jury awards such as the $2.9 million in punitive damages awarded to an 81-year-
old woman who spilled McDonald's coffee on her lap"); Peter Kendall & Janan Hanna,
Push to Cap Jury Awards Promises no Clear Winners; Backers, Opponents Have Few
Facts to Cite, CH. Tm., Feb. 10, 1995, at D1 (addressing the McDonald's coffee case);
Terry Moran, Eye the Jury: But Give Them Credit for Prevailing Over Lawyers, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at C1 (discussing the fact that damage awards in civil cases that reach
into the millions of dollars for seemingly trivial injuries, like spilling hot McDonald's coffee
on oneself, fuel the public's discontent with the system).
129. McDonald's Settles Out of Court Over Coffee Burns, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec.
5, 1994, News at 4.
130. Coyle v. Purolator Armored, Inc., 729 F.2d 1446 (3d Cir. 1984) (unpublished opin-
ion). For a description of this case, and of the district court decision dismissing it, see De-
nise Waldon, Judge Kills Coyle's Suit vs. Purolator, PHLA. INQUMER, June 22, 1983, at B1.
131. Jesse Birnbaum, Crybabies: Eternal Victims, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 16-17 (refer-
ring to the suit of Christopher Duffy). In another case, the plaintiff and two companions
stole a pizza delivery car which had been left running while the driver made a delivery.
Matos v. Rivera, 648 A.2d 337, 338 (Pa. Super. 1994). The thieves crashed the car, causing
injury to the plaintiff, who then sued the pizza deliverer as well as the pizza parlor, alleging
that their negligence in failing to prevent the theft was the proximate cause of his injury. Id.
at 338-39. Dismissal on the pleadings was affirmed. Id. at 340-41.
132. E.g., Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 496 P.2d 1276 (Cal. 1972); Schofield v.
Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1982); Denton v. Vail, 541 P.2d 511 (Or. App. 1975).
133. E.g., Merino v. City of New York, 583 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 600 N.E. 2d 652 (N.Y. 1992). For a discussion of the Merino case, see infra notes
162-75 and accompanying text. A majority of jurisdictions impose no duty on hosts to con-
sumers of alcohol. See, e.g., Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 11-12 (Cal. 1981); Fisher v.
O'Connor's Inc., 452 A.2d 1313, 1315-16 (Md. 1982). A few jurisdictions, however, have held
that, under proper circumstances, an injured drinker has a cause of action against the party
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against automobile manufacturers who, after all, should have realized
that automobile occupants could not have been expected to take simple
precautions for their own safety.13 4 There is no shortage of people who
could have protected themselves through simple, inexpensive measures
but preferred to expose themselves to injury and then sue others who
arguably might have protected them through more complex, expensive
measures.
1 3 5
Comimunitarians have expressed concern that neoliberal notions as to
the merits of private ordering will restore an era of classical tort and con-
tract theory in which legal duties are bargained away. 3" In the context of
tort law, this could mean a return to a pre-Henningsen3 7 regime in which
hard bargains are enforced against an unwary public. I see little evidence,
however, that this will be the case.238 Instead, I see a healthy reemergence
of the assumption of risk doctrine with respect to discretionary activities,
such as sports, which are not necessary to the sustenance of life and
serving the drinks. E.g., Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Colo. 1989); Boehm v. Kish,
517 A.2d 624, 627 (Conn. 1986); Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45
(Fla. 1991); Klingerman v. SOL Corp., 505 A.2d 474, 478 (Me. 1986); Sommerness v. Quadna
Resort Serv., 416 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Jevning v. Skyline Bar, 726 P.2d
326, 328 (Mont. 1986); Christiansen v. Campbell, 328 S.E.2d 351, 355 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
134. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978). The Daly case
involved a man who died in an automobile accident when he was thrown from his Buick
Opel, which had struck a median guardrail. Id. at 1164. There was evidence that Daly was
intoxicated, that he had failed to lock his door, and that he had failed to fasten an available
seat belt. Id. at 1165. His heirs sued General Motors, claiming that the push-button design
of the door latch was responsible for his injuries. Id. In other words, a safer design would
have protected Daly from the consequences of his own negligence. The California courts
used the case to reintroduce comparative fault concepts to products cases. Id. at 1172. The
Daly court also noted that in considering whether the vehicle was defective in design, the
trier of fact could take into account the safety features that the manufacturer had already
built into the car (but that Daly had failed to use). Id. at 1175.
135. The law of products liability is deficient in this regard, in that it tends to be both
overprotective and underprotective. It is overprotective of product users who claim that the
manufacturer failed to protect them from misuse of the product. See, e.g., Jonescue v. Jewel
Home Shopping Serv., 306 N.E.2d 312, 318 (III. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that manufacturer
may be liable for child's ingestion of liquid cleaner left in vanity under sink by mother).
Products liability law is underprotective to third party victims who were injured due to the
foreseeable consequences of a product's inherently dangerous design. For a discussion of
courts' unwillingness to hold gun merchants and manufacturers of alcoholic beverages ac-
countable for the injuries caused by their products, see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying
text.
136. John C. Coffee, Remarks at Session on Communitarian Approaches to Law and
Social Policy, Association of American Law Schools Annual Conference (January 8, 1994);
see also Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 833
(1983) (viewing current state of contract law as being somewhere along a continuum
anchored at one end by classical theory).
137. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1960) (voiding a limited
warranty which covered only replacement of defective parts on a motor vehicle).
138. Nor do I see widespread adoption of the theories of the Chicago School of eco-
nomics in tort cases, the opinions of Judge Richard Posner notwithstanding. See, e.g., Was-
sell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
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limb.13 For example, in Hammond v. Board of Education of Carroll
County,"1 0 a teenage girl sued her school board for injuries she had sus-
tained while playing varsity football, alleging failure to warn. The court
dismissed the suit, recognizing that the plaintiff could be held to under-
stand that voluntary participation in the sport of football entails some
danger.1 4 1 This type of result should be applauded by communitarians, as
it recognizes that individuals should take some responsibility for their
own well-being, and should not be able to avail themselves of legal reme-
dies when their venturesome conduct results in foreseeable harm to
themselves.
14 2
4. "Blame it on city hall" cases
The second class of cases in which liability has been imposed too fre-
quently involves plaintiffs who view the government as the ultimate pro-
tector against all that may befall them. Some of these cases are outright
silly, like that of the man who sued the State of Utah because he was
attacked by a wild coyote while sleeping at a rest area on an interstate
highway, 43 or the woman who sued the Pennsylvania Lottery Comnmis-
sion, alleging that the Commission owed her $1.5 million in compensation
139. Initially, waivers of tort protection were voided by the courts where they involved
the necessities of life, such as food and housing. E.g., Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357,
382 (1873) (common carrier); Papakalos v. Shaka, 18 A.2d 377, 379 (N.H. 1941) (rental
housing); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corporation, 486 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. 1971)
(rental housing); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 383 P.2d 441, 447-48 (Cal. 1963) (medi-
cal care); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 705/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (any covenants or
agreements exempting lessor from liability are void); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321 (McKin-
ney 1989) (exculpatory clauses in rental of real property void). In the 1960s and 1970s,
courts and legislatures, usually acting on an ad hoc basis, adopted a paternalistic view under
which tort waivers were voided even with respect to non-essential activities such as sports
and the acquisition of luxury items. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 970
(Wash. 1988) (interscholastic sports); Baker v. City of Seattle, 484 P.2d 405, 406 (Wash.
1971) (rental of golf cart, where exculpatory clause was in standard form agreement); see
also N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1989) (agreements exempting from liability
owners of pools, gyms, and places of amusement or recreation void where owner receives
compensation for use). This type of action serves, in the long run, only to stifle venturous-
ness and economic activity, and to place certain activities out of the reach of the economi-
cally deprived. See MmTON R. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 98-100 (1962); cf. RIcHARD A.
PosNER, ECONohuc ANALYsIs OF LAW 356-59 (1977) (arguing that enforcement of housing
code reduces supply and raises the cost of low income housing).
140. 639 A.2d 223 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
141. Id. at 227.
142. I would be among the first to applaud this young woman's venture into a tradi-
tionally male undertaking, although Etzioni's concern about the minting of new rights cau-
tions me against saying that she had a "right" to do so. But underlying her choice to
participate in football should be an assumption of the risks involved in that venture. She
simply cannot have it both ways; if rights are indeed involved, then she has a right to take
her lumps with the rest of the guys.
143. See KOHUT, supra note 10, at 32-33. My inability (and that of my research assist-
ants) to find any reference to this case in a more "respectable" source causes me to wonder
whether this story is apocryphal.
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for ten years of losing tickets.'4 Other cases, however, are a good deal
more serious, like that of Linda Riss.145 Linda Riss, a resident of New
York City, repeatedly asked for police protection from a jilted suitor who
had been threatening her.148 The police told her that they could not pro-
vide protection unless and until she was actually attacked.147 Indeed, af-
ter a thug hired by the suitor had thrown lye in Ms. Riss' face, the police
provided around-the-clock protection. 1 4 By then, however, Ms. Riss had
been scarred for life. Ms. Riss sued the city, but her case was not allowed
to reach the jury.149 The New York Court of Appeals, over a strong dis-
sent by Judge Keating, felt that the city could not be responsible for the
protection of all of its citizens, even those whom it knew were in peril. °0
The Riss case presented an attractive, sympathetic plaintiff against
an institutional defendant which, despite reports of financial hardship,
continues to have substantial, but finite, resources at its disposal. How
easy it would have been to allow this suit to go forward and allow a jury
blessed with twenty-twenty hindsight to determine that a reasonable po-
lice department would have provided the requested protection. Neverthe-
less, liability in this case would have had to rest on the premise that the
city-simply by dint of establishing a police department-had a duty to
protect its citizens from harm. A noble aspiration, to be sure, but it is not
a duty to be imposed lightly through judicial decision. The ultimate rea-
soning of the majority was that the expenditure of some of New York's
limited resources to protect Linda Riss (and others like her) was a legisla-
tive policy decision, and not a judicial decision.' 5'
Too many recent tort cases involve citizens imposing demands on be-
leaguered governmental units, insisting that the government do more,
provide more, spend more. 10 These demands are in part a product of our
144. See Jackie Cohen, She Hopes for a Lotto Legal Luck, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1994, at
A27.
145. Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
146. Id. at 862 (Keating, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 860-61.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 861. Linda Riss went on to marry the man who had hired the thug to throw
lye in her face, after his release from prison. Carol Angus, City Legend: What They Did for
Love, NEWSDAY, April 26, 1990, at 4. I am not sure that this proves anything, but it may
suggest that there is a realm of personal responsibility for things that "happen" to us, and
that our fortunes, good and bad, cannot all be attributed to the misdeeds of others, or to
"society."
152. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189(1989) (arguing that state failed to protect child from abusive father); Smith v. City &
County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125 (Colo. 1986) (regarding failure to fill in natural swimming
hole to protect trespassing swimmers); Seiber v. State, 211 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1973) (failure
to post deer crossing signs); Lucas v. Dinkins, 608 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (de-
manding more public toilets); Babcock v. State, No. 84-2-00850-1 (Wash. Super. Ct., Benton
County, 1994) (regarding placement of children in foster care with abusive uncle, resulting
in a $2,475,000 verdict against the state).
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culture of complaint,1 53 and in part a reflection of our growing expecta-
tions of government-the latter probably being a function of the for-
mer. 154 We seem to have abandoned responsible political decisionmaking
for squeaky-wheel-gets-the-grease adjudications, in which individuals line
up at the trough to have their complaints addressed by the courts.155 A
rising conservative tide in state and national legislatures might actually
exacerbate this problem, as frustrated citizens increasingly turn to the
judiciary to address complaints better suited to the legislative agenda. 56
The result, I fear, is a gross misallocation of public resources. 57
Thus, we have the Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Cor-
153. For a discussion of the "culture of complaint," see infra note 169 and accompany-
ing text.
154. Recent election returns would seem to indicate that the voters would actually
prefer that the government do less. Less for others, that is. As one retiring congressman,
Fred Grandy, said a few days before the 1994 mid-term elections: "We in Congress are the
products of the conflicted consumers that send us to the polls every year, the people that
want their entitlements expanded and their taxes cut, pork trimmed and bacon brought
home." Interview with Rep. Fred Grandy, All Things Considered, National Public Radio
(Oct. 26, 1994).
155. This is, quite possibly, a reflection of gridlock or lack of confidence in the politi-
cal system, a problem addressed by Professor Etzioni at great length. ETZIONI, supra note 1,
at 209-25. I am not sure that I fault individuals for trying to get their complaints addressed
by the courts, in light of their frustrations with the political system. Certainly Linda Brown
had every right to have her frustration with Topeka's segregated school system addressed by
the courts. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). I would much rather see the
courts reserved for challenges such as Ms. Brown's, involving the deprivation of fundamen-
tal rights, than the relatively trivial challenges to government like those mounted by New
York's pothole brigade. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. I like to think that
this is what Professor Etzioni means when he suggests a moratorium on the minting of new
rights. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
156. As conservative legislatures reduce funding for services to the general public (like
public education), resources will be further squeezed by tort damages that are not subjected
to legislative scrutiny. Trespassers injured on public school property might thereby obtain
large tort awards, while the children inside the schools sit forty to a classroom.
157. Nathan Glazer has spoken and written eloquently of New York's decline as a
"world city," in which "emblems of pride such as skyscrapers, bridges, the Statue of Liberty,
and the grand entrance to New York Harbor . . . have been joined by new emblems: gar-
bage-strewn streets, graffiti-marred subways and buildings, half-abandoned housing, an ever
more visible disturbed and derelict population." Nathan Glazer, Fate of a World City, CrrY
J., Autumn 1993, at 20. Glazer attributes this decline to the City's having undergone "a
massive change in the 1960s, as a result of which it still suffers." Id. at 21. Glazer writes:
New York stopped trying to do well the kinds of things a city can do, and
started trying to do the kinds of things a city cannot do. The things a city can do
include keeping its streets and bridges in repair, building new facilities to ac-
commodate new needs and a shifting population, picking up the garbage, and
policing the public environment. Among the things it can't do are redistributing
income on a large scale and solving the social and personal problems of people
who, for whatever reason, are .ngaged in self-destructive behavior-resisting
school, taking to drugs and crime, indulging in self-gratification at the expense
of their children, their families, their neighbors.
Id. I fear that by mandating performance of certain obligations, the courts may burden
cities like New York with more and more things that they cannot do (to the betterment of a
few), to the detriment of those things they can and should do, to the betterment of all.
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poration (Big Apple), a public-spirited enterprise dedicated to the protec-
tion of New Yorkers from the hazards of the city's potholes. In 1979, New
York City enacted an ordinance requiring that it receive prior notification
of a pothole's existence in order to be held liable for any accident attribu-
table to its lack of repair.158 In response to the ordinance, the New York
Trial Lawyers Association established Big Apple to map each and every
one of New York's potholes, and to furnish these maps to the City.159
One might thank the trial lawyers for providing this service gratis to
New York's citizens. Ideally, the pothole list works as a deterrent to
shoddy street maintenance. But the existence of toll-free city streets
should not carry with it a duty on the part of the municipal government
to keep them in perfect repair for the benefit of every private automobile
and truck driver who should choose to use them and every pedestrian
who cares not to look where she is going. Moreover, the availability of
damages for the city's failure to fix potholes is not matched by tort reme-
dies for deficient schools, inadequate public health facilities, or a myriad
of other important functions one might lay at the city's doorstep. There is
no "Big Apple Student Protection Corporation" sending a list of over-
crowded schools to New York's Board of Education, with the implicit
threat of tort liability."' Thus, New York City repairs potholes and de-
lays the opening of school to remove asbestos from city classrooms," 1
while reducing the number of teachers in an already overburdened school
system. The municipal budget process becomes not a matter of rational
prioritization, but a contest to see who can best capture the attention of
court and jury.
158. New York City Administrative Code § 394a-1.0(d).
159. See Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Comm., Inc. v. Ameruso, 442
N.Y.S.2d 860, 860 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Joseph P. Fried, Just in Case Anybody Decides to Sue,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at Bi; Clyde Haberman, Lawyers' Group Files Long Brief on
City Hazards, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 1980, at B3.
160. A federal mandate does obligate New York and all other states to provide a "free
appropriate public education" to all school-age children with disabilities. Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988). This mandate is enforceable through
court actions that can be brought by parents, and the costs of compliance can be quite high.
In some states, students identified as "gifted" have similar rights. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 10-76a, 10-76d(d) (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-5 (Michie 1993); 24 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 13-1371, 13-1372 (1992). Attention to the educational needs of disabled students
had been long overdue, but the legislative mandates, in the absence of similar provisions to
protect all students, require financially strapped school districts to provide a disproportion-
ate amount of services to a favored class of students.
161. Removal of asbestos from school buildings is obviously a laudable enterprise in
furtherance of public health. But what made asbestos removal a sudden "emergency" in the
fall of 1993 was not an increased health risk; rather, it was an alarmist attitude reflective of
the fickleness of the culture of complaint, which finds a new itch to be scratched each day.
For a discussion regarding the degree of actual risk posed by asbestos in the New York
Schools, see Matthew L. Wald, Experts Say Fear of Asbestos Exceeds the Risk in Schools,
N.Y. TamEs, Sept. 4, 1993, § 1, at 1.
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C. Brother's Keeper or Culture of Complaint?
The recent case of Merino v. City of New York1 62 demonstrates the
paradox between two communitarian ideals: the urge to encourage hu-
mane acts for the benefit of one's fellow citizens and the desire to foster
individual responsibility. Francisco Merino was a thirty-year-old dish-
washer who, while intoxicated, fell on a set of New York subway tracks
and was struck by a train.1 8 Having lost his left arm in the accident,
Merino sued the New York Transit Authority and obtained a jury verdict
for $9.3 million.'" Popular reaction to the nationally publicized verdict
was typified by Chicago-based columnist Mike Royko, who wrote, with
obvious sarcasm:
What kind of cruel society are we, to let someone like Francisco get
himself drunk, buy a subway token, then fall in front of a train? Where
were the transit police when Francisco needed them? Or, for that mat-
ter, where were you? Where was I? How indifferent can we get? 65
Mr. Merino's claim falls into both of the categories about which I am
concerned. He is a victim of his own foolishness, and he has asked that
the City of New York (just in case it had nothing else to worry about)
protect him from the consequences. As Mr. Royko said:
Most of us would wake up in the hospital [after such an accident] and
moan: 'Oh, boy, I got drunk, fell off a subway platform, and now I have
only one arm. Am I stupid or am I stupid?' So that's why we need
lawyers-to explain to us that what we did wasn't really our fault. And
to find those who really were to blame for what we did and make them
take responsibility. 68
Most of us-even Royko, by his own admission-would be sympa-
thetic to a man who had just lost his arm in a needless accident. But
many of us would also say that he had chutzpah61 to blame someone else
for harm for which he was primarily responsible."8 Merino's situation
162. 583 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 600 N.E.2d 652 (N.Y.
1992).
163. Id. at 397-98.
164. City Liable for Injuries Sustained by Man who Fell onto Subway Tracks; Fail-
ure to Adequately Light Subway Station, VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS, available in
LEXIS, VERDCT Library, SHEPJV File [hereinafter City Liable].
165. Royko, supra note 10, at C3.
166. Id.
167. For the legal etymology of this word, see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Law-
suit, Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J. 463, 463-64 (1993).
168. Two qualifications should be inserted here: First, it is more than a semantic quib-
ble to contend that Merino did not blame the Transit Authority, that he merely sued the
Transit Authority. Obviously the suit was based on legal blame. But one cannot fault a one-
armed dishwasher for taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the legal system to
obtain substantial compensation for his disabling injury. Nor can we fault his lawyer for
playing his assigned role in an adversarial system and arguing legal theories that could pro-
duce a large judgment for his client. If a miscarriage of justice has occurred here (and we
reserve judgment on this issue), responsibility lies with the courts and juries that allowed
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typifies what Robert Hughes has called a "culture of complaint," 16 9 in
which the popular pastime is to claim some form of victimization. In such
a culture, the sense of shared experience and ideals becomes frayed. Life
becomes not an effort to see what one can contribute to the community;
rather, it becomes an effort to see what compensation one can obtain for
one's victimization. Thus, an injured dishwasher, assisted by lawyers in
pursuit of a contingent fee, grasps with his remaining arm for the brass
ring, and tries to get what he can while he can. Moreover, a jury of alien-
ated citizens, identifying more with the victim than with the body politic,
responds sympathetically to his complaint against a municipal
corporation. 170
The trial judge set aside the Merino verdict (a dog-bites-man event
that garnered far less press attention than the original jury verdict) and,
after an appeal, the case was remanded for a new trial.271 At the second
trial, an award of $3.6 million was reduced to $2.7 million to reflect the
second jury's finding that Merino was twenty-four percent at fault. 172 The
Transit Authority was found liable due to its failure to adequately light
the station, which in turn prevented the subway brakeman from spotting
Merino on the tracks in sufficient time to stop the train. At the first trial,
Merino's attorney also had advanced the theory that the Transit Author-
ity had a duty to come to Merino's assistance before his fall, and that it
had violated its own procedures by failing to dispatch someone to the
platform to assist Merino after a token clerk had reported Merino's
condition.1 7 3
Communitarians could respond sympathetically to Mr. Merino's
claim. We have previously discussed Professor Glendon's suggestion that,
in keeping with our responsibilities to the community, the law ought to
impose a duty to act as a Good Samaritan and rescue someone in peril.1 7'
Merino's claim to go forward and have thus far rewarded him with two favorable verdicts.
The second qualification is that some of us who have viewed this case from afar (Mr.
Royko and I among them) have substituted our assessment of fault for that of a jury that,
after having heard all the evidence proffered by both sides, found Merino to have been only
24% at fault. Had Mr. Royko or I sat on that jury, perhaps we would have persuaded our
peers that Merino's fault was much greater; fortunately for Mr. Merino, neither Mr. Royko
nor I (both of whom live outside the jurisdiction) were selected. Or perhaps Mr. Royko and
I, having seen and heard the evidence first-hand, would have agreed with the other members
of the jury, and found for Mr. Merino. I have my doubts, however.
169. ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT 67 (1993).
170. The criminal law counterpart to this phenomenon is exemplified by the Menen-
dez case, in which two brothers accused of killing their parents have thus far escaped con-
viction by claiming that they were victims of child abuse. People v. Menendez, No. BA
068880 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Calif., filed March 12, 1990). This very nearly ap-
proaches the classic definition of chutzpah, in which a man kills both his parents and begs
the court for mercy because he's an orphan. Kozinski & Volokh, supra note 167, at 467.
171. Merino v. City of New York, No. 18730/89 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. N.Y., March
19, 1993).
172. City Liable, supra note 164, at *1.
173. Merino, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
174. For a discussion of the duty to rescue, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying
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A fellow citizen on the platform, once aware of Merino's condition, might
thereby have a duty to keep him out of danger, so long as that duty could
be fulfilled at relatively little personal cost. If that be the case, it is easy
to see how the Transit Authority, which had taken on the duties of a
common carrier, could owe a duty to protect Merino once it became
aware of his condition. Indeed, such a result could be reached without
expansion of the Good Samaritan doctrine. The provision of adequate
lighting is an even easier, self-evident duty to impose on a common car-
rier. Viewed in this manner, the verdict is not at all shocking. The
Transit Authority breached its duties, Merino was injured as a conse-
quence, and his own fault is dealt with under the rubric of comparative
negligence, which, in New York as in most jurisdictions, reduces but does
not bar recovery. 75
One searches for an articulable rule that will produce a result consis-
tent with the popular reaction to the case. Assumption of risk does not
work here because the plaintiff was too intoxicated to knowingly assume
any risk. Nor would we want to revert to a system in which contributory
negligence served as a complete defense. That system punished the vic-
tim, exonerated the wrongdoer, and was justifiably abandoned as draco-
nian.176 A modified comparative negligence system, in which the plaintiff
is denied recovery if his negligence is greater than that of the defen-
dant,17 7 is appealing. Likewise, the "gross/slight" approach used in South
Dakota-in which contributory negligence bars recovery unless the plain-
tiff's negligence is slight compared to that of the defendant4-has simi-
lar appeal. Neither of these systems, however, holds a negligent defendant
accountable to the appropriate extent; 79 both are prone to mathematical
tinkering. And both would produce a plaintiff's verdict in the Merino
case, assuming that the jury were to hold fast to its determination that
the plaintiff was only twenty-four percent at fault. Perhaps, in the end,
our only problem with the Merino verdict is the modest percentage as-
signed by the jury to the plaintiff's fault.
175. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1995).
176. Only six United States jurisdictions continue to apply the common-law rule that
contributory negligence completely bars an injured person's recovery against a negligent
tortfeasor. These are: Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia. See Tyler v. City of Enterprise, 577 So. 2d 876, 878 (Ala. 1991);
District of Columbia v. Brown, 589 A.2d 384, 387 (D.C. 1991); Board of Trustees of Balti-
more County Community Colleges v. RTKL Assocs., Inc., 559 A.2d 805, 810 (Md. 1989);
Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 332 N.C. 645, 648, 423 S.E.2d 72, 73
(1992); Cooper v. County of Florence, 412 S.E.2d 417, 418 (S.C. 1991); Kelly v. Virginia Elec.
and Power Co., 381 S.E.2d 219, 223 (Va. 1989).
177. E.g., COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1994); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85
(West 1994); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1995).
178. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS AN. § 20-9-2 (1995).
179. For much the same reason, I have advocated employment of the seat belt defense,
even in cases where the negligence of another person (typically the driver of another vehicle)
is the principal cause of the accident and the plaintiff's resulting injury. See Robert M.
Ackerman, The Seat Belt Defense Revisited: A Return to Accountability in Tort Law?, 16
N.M. L. REv. 221, 248-49 (1986) [hereinafter Ackerman, Seat Belt Defense].
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Communitarians looking at the Merino case might proclaim that we
are all our brothers' keepers, and impose an obligation on the Transit
Authority. Alternatively, we might see too great a strain imposed on the
community by the insistence (abandoned in the second trial) that it re-
spond to every citizen in apparent need of assistance. Had the transit
police moved Mr. Merino to a place of relative safety-Central Park, for
instance-and he then fell victim to further mischief, they might again
have been held liable.18 0 Perhaps they should have placed him in a posi-
tion of even greater safety-a room with a view on Riker's Island-and
invited a civil rights complaint. Damned if you do and damned if you
don't: such is life and liability in the culture of complaint.
I do not wish to push this too far, nor do I wish to make poor Mr.
Merino the scapegoat for the widespread deficit in responsibility that
plagues our nation.181 It is tempting to rant and rave about tort actions
that make seemingly outrageous demands of others or involve trivial of-
fenses. For too long, however, the law of torts has been rigged against
those who have had to endure disproportionate harm for the sake of the
"community. '182 In many of those cases, the "community" turned out to
be corporate or government interests that were, in effect, being subsidized
by the uncompensated harm inflicted upon citizens.'83 An assortment of
"no duty" rules, the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity, and the
negligence doctrine itself have all resulted in the absorption of a dispro-
portionate amount of loss by relatively small pockets of the community,
presumably for the greater good. The negligence doctrine grew out of the
theory that the community prospers when people engage in risk-generat-
ing activity; therefore one is held liable only for the creation of unreason-
able risks. If reasonable risks harm one's neighbor, that is just something
she has to suffer for the betterment of all.'" Into each life a little rain
180. Something very much akin to that occurred in Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362
N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1977). In that case, police officers "rescued" a pair of drunks from a down-
town street, depositing them in an abandoned golf course to sleep it off. Id. at 962. When
one of the drunks, aroused from his slumber, stumbled into thruway traffic near the golf
course, he sued the city for his injuries and recovered. Id. at 965.
181. Professor Etzioni provides some examples of this deficit in responsibility. One
such example: During a program on the savings and loan mess, a member of the television
audience says, "The taxpayers should not have to pay for this; the government should."
ETzIoNI, supra note 1, at 3. Another example: Politicians, instead of committing tax dollars
to public education or drug elimination, grasp for "nontaxing solutions" such as school
choice and saying "no" to drugs. Id. at 4.
182. In many cases that harm resulted in secondary costs that the community ulti-
mately had to bear, in the form of either increased costs of medical care, public assistance to
victims' families, or decreased productivity. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS
27-29 (1970).
183. See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L.
REv. 151, 152 (1946); LAWRENCE M. FREEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 (2d ed.
1985).
184. For example, in Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853), the plaintiff sued the Alcalde
of San Francisco for blowing up and destroying his house and property, in order to stop the
progress of a fire. The appellate court reversed a plaintiff's verdict, based on the defense of
public necessity. Id. at 74-75. The case is frequently reproduced in torts casebooks and cited
[Vol. 30
1995] TORT LAW
must fall, and if it falls disproportionately into some lives, the unfortu-
nate few can just maintain a stiff upper lip for the sake of the "commu-
nity." "It's a shame your son Billy died in the war, ma'am, but we're all
better off for his sacrifice," says the war profiteer as he shuffles off, pock-
eting his ill-gotten gains. It is easy to bemoan the culture of complaint
when one has no complaints.
I. A COMMUNITARIAN TORT REGIME: WHAT IT MIGHT LOOK LIKE, AND
How WE MIGHT GET THERE
A. Changing the Rules
The challenge for communitarians, then, is to mold liability rules
that impose costs on those who are most responsible for harm, without
coddling those who are in the best position to look out for themselves.8 5
We should also promote rules that emphasize the need for people to take
greater responsibility for their own well-being. Enforcement of the seat
belt and motorcycle helmet defenses, for example, would be a way to un-
derscore the need to take reasonable measures for one's own protection., 6
The insistence that one has the "right" to have one's brains smashed to
pieces through failure to exercise these simple precautions is the epitome
of radical individualism. 87 All too often, it is the community that has to
pick up the pieces-through subsidized medical care, support for families,
and other services-when this "right" comes to fruition in the form of
for that generally accepted principle. Granted, however, that there was a public need to
destroy the plaintiff's property, could not the public (through the City and Alcalde) have
compensated the plaintiff for his disproportionate loss, rather than leave him to bear it
alone? If this is viewed as too great a toll to assess against the public coffers, then how much
greater a loss was it for one individual to bear alone? See also United States v. Caltex, Inc.,
344 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1952) (denying compensation to owner of petroleum facility destroyed
by U.S. Army before it could fall into enemy hands); id. at 156 (persuasive dissent by Jus-
tices Black and Douglas); Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630, 639 (6th Cir. 1991) (deny-
ing recovery to residents of polluted area against federal government agency that had
deliberately concealed health dangers created by toxic disposal).
185. Judge Guido Calabresi's suggestion that liability be imposed on the best cost
avoider deserves greater attention in this regard. CALABRESI, supra note 182, at 135. While
Judge Calabresi's solution would fail to impose a degree of liability on every person playing
a role in the harm, it would concentrate responsibility on the party best able to avoid harm,
thereby eliminating the dilution of incentive for accident avoidance arguably imposed by a
comparative negligence regime.
Perhaps Judge Calabresi's rule could be modified to deal with those situations in which
the best cost avoider is judgment-proof (perhaps by imposing secondary liability on the
next-best cost avoider), thereby reducing the likelihood that the plaintiff will go uncompen-
sated and impose secondary costs on the community.
186. I have advocated the seat belt defense elsewhere, and will not belabor the point
here. See generally Ackerman, Seat Belt Defense, supra note 179 (advocating seat belt de-
fense). Correctly applied, neither the seat belt nor helmet defenses eliminate all recovery on
the part of the injured party; the person responsible for the initial collision remains liable
for a large part of the damages, in recognition of the fact that her lack of care remains a
cause of all of the damages. See id. at 232-33.
187. See Russell Baker, Observer; The Belted Coward, N.Y. TiNrs, Feb. 2, 1985, at 21.
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greater accident costs. Therefore, it is altogether fitting for the commu-
nity to demand that people take better care of themselves (at least as a
condition to tort recovery) and to adopt rules consistent with this
maxim. 18
Many of these rules can be adopted by the courts in the process of
common law adjudication. Others, such as enhanced protection for
whistleblowers 89 will probably require legislative intervention. Because
of the episodic nature of litigation and the politically erratic nature of
state and national legislatures (which tend to address the hot button is-
sues of the moment), it may be difficult to advance a cohesive communi-
tarian agenda on all fronts. But judges, legislators, and administrative
rulemakers can keep communitarian principles in mind while considering
measures that have a potential impact on the community at large. More-
over, a communitarian agenda need not be entirely dependent on govern-
mental rule making. The choices of whether to assist a person in need, to
press one's advantage through a lawsuit, or to cause environmental dam-
age involve decisions with communitarian implications which are made by
private individuals and institutions on a daily basis. Advancement of a
communitarian agenda should entail a commitment on the part of private
actors to take responsibility for the societal consequences of their deci-
sions, not to wait for government to take charge and impose a regime of
repressive moralism.
None of the foregoing will be accomplished unless a cadre of commit-
ted communitarians commits itself to advancing a communitarian agenda
in business, law, government, education, and every other phase of life
that has an impact on the community. The very nature of communitari-
anism makes this problematic. Communitarians, by and large, are not
rabid believers chanting a simplistic, one-note philosophy. Rather, we
tend to be moderates who recognize the dangers of the extremes of left
and right and reject facile, simplistic solutions. Lacking the zeal of reli-
gious fundamentalists, civil libertarians, and even self-proclaimed "feder-
alists," communitarians may be ill-suited to advance a consistent program
of reform on a broad front. But advance it we must, lest the community
be overrun by the shrill call of radical individualists or authoritarian
extremists.
Prominent among those private actors capable of advancing a com-
munitarian agenda are lawyers. Lawyers, although ethically obligated to
188. We might concede to libertarians a "right" not to protect oneself in this manner,
by not imposing criminal sanctions for failure to wear a helmet or fasten a seat belt, so long
as they do not avail themselves of the civil justice system (through tort actions) and the
social support system (through public hospitals, disability payments, and the like) when
injury occurs. As a practical matter, however, it is hard to isolate services supported by the
community when accidents occur. And we would be most reluctant to allow entire families
(including children) to suffer from a lack of social services because Mommy or Daddy de-
cided to go riding without a helmet. We are all inextricably bound to one another; that is,
perhaps, the central message of communitarianism.
189. For a discussion of the issue of increased protection for whistleblowers, see supra
notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30
TORT LAW
carry out legitimate client objectives, 19 0 nevertheless exert considerable
influence over client choices. I refuse to blame lawyers, particularly plain-
tiffs' personal injury lawyers, for pushing the buttons that the legal appa-
ratus provides for the benefit of their clients. I believe, however, that
lawyers frequently base their advice to clients on purely legal considera-
tions, ignoring the moral, economic, social, and political factors that may
be relevant to the client's situation. 1 Too often lawyers go charging
ahead, asserting legal claims, without pausing even to allow the client to
reflect on the impact of these claims on others in the community.192 1 also
believe that lawyers should be held accountable for failing to avail their
clients of devices such as mediation and other appropriate forms of dis-
pute resolution, 98 through which they can resolve their disputes and at
the same time heal the wounds that divide our society into warring camps
of victims and those worthy of blame.
B. Changing the Game
That our government maintains a system of courts through which
people may obtain compensation for injury, and that access to these
courts is in fact available to all those with colorable claims, 94 is a credit
to the American legal system.195 My fear, however, is that in our preoccu-
190. Rule 1.2(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "[a] lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2(a) (1987). This rule illustrates the distinction between the
objectives of the representation and the means necessary to accomplish those objectives.
The lawyer remains in charge of determining the means of representation. See AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT 30 (1992).
191. Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "In repre-
senting a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render can-
did advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 2.1 (1987).
192. In similar fashion, I would hold corporate lawyers accountable for failing to alert
their clients to non-legal concerns such as "moral, economic, social and political factors"
which might influence decisionmaking. See id.
193. I prefer the term "appropriate dispute resolution," coined by Albie Davis and
Howard Gadlin, to the more popular term, "alternative dispute resolution." See Albie M.
Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fashioned Way-We Earn It!, 4
NEGOTIATION J. 55, 62 (1988); see also Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Integrat-
ing Dispute Resolution into Standard First-Year Courses: The Missouri Plan, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 509, 510 (1989) (advocating introduction of alternative dispute resolution into first-
year law school curriculum). With most cases being resolved through some form of pre-trial
settlement, it is unclear which process is the "alternative." Thus, it is better to emphasize
use of the dispute resolution methodology appropriate to a given case.
194. In light of the underfunding of legal services programs, this access is largely pro-
vided through a maligned contingent fee system.
195. An impassioned defense of this system may be found in Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089-90 (1984). Professor Fiss writes:
To conceive of the civil lawsuit in public terms as America does might be
unique. I am willing to assume that no other country... has a case like Brown
v. Board of Education in which the judicial power is used to eradicate the caste
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pation with litigation, we have ignored other equally valid means to ob-
tain redress for our problems. Our system of resolving tort claims can
respond through creative solutions that serve the interests of all parties
while healing the wounds of the community. For example, what if the
New York Transit Authority, in response to Mr. Merino's claim, were to
provide the costs of his medical treatment, placement in a program for
alcoholics (if his drunkenness was not an isolated incident), and gainful,
long-term employment, perhaps as a token clerk? A bit fanciful, you
might say, in light of the multimillion dollar judgment Mr. Merino may
someday enjoy. But while such a settlement would furnish far less cash to
Mr. Merino, it would provide him with greater dignity and opportunity
than any money award he might ultimately receive.9 6 Mr. Merino would
have the opportunity to resume his role as a productive member of the
community, rather than viewing himself as a lifelong victim. The Transit
Authority would be a true partner in that enterprise, instead of being cast
as a legal gladiator, preoccupied with fending off blame in costly and
seemingly endless litigation.19
7
Tort disputes are too readily transformed so as to shift the focus
away from the parties' real interests into a stylized battle between proxies
(i.e., lawyers and insurance companies) in an adversarial system. 98 An
structure. I am willing to assume that no other country conceives of law and uses
law in quite the way we do. But this should be a source of pride rather than
shame . . . .Adjudication American-style is not a reflection of our combative-
ness but rather a tribute to our inventiveness and perhaps even more to our
commitment.
Id.
While I agree with Professor Fiss' accolades to the manner in which our system protects
individual rights, I disagree with his tendency to view alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion as instruments of repression rather than as instruments of empowerment. Cf. ROBERT
A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 229-59 (1994) (advocating
mediation as a powerful substitute for litigation).
196. What such a resolution would not do is satisfy the financial expectations of most
plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers. How do you take one-third of a job, of an alcohol treat-
ment program, or of an apology? Likewise, the settlement would not fit into the pattern of
disputing of most liability insurers, who can speak knowingly of cash and structured
payouts, but are not in the habit of providing services. More humanistic responses to injury
claims will therefore require adjustments on the part of those who play an integral role in
the litigation process.
197. A parallel may be seen in Leslie Bender's call for a feminist ethic of care, which
would approach legal accountability in terms of responsibility and care, rather than rights-
based liability expressed in financial terms. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on
the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 901-12
(1990). As a practical manner, this ethic of care is more likely to be achieved through negoti-
ated and mediated solutions, rather than through traditional adjudication. Thus, Professor
Baruch Bush has suggested that the communitarian approach to tort law may serve as "a
mediating structure between the individual and society as a whole." Baruch Bush, Between
Two Worlds, supra note 6, at 1530.
198. As one commentator states:
In counseling clients lawyers may tell them what remedies are legally possible
...and thus preclude inquiry into alternatives which the client might prefer or
which might be easier to obtain from the other party. . . . [S]ome disputants
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injured party's desire to be restored to full participation in the commu-
nity, an injurer's desire to make amends for a wrong, and the longing of
both parties for reconciliation and healing, all give way to a litigation
dance played by a plaintiff's lawyer dependent upon a contingent fee and
a defendant's insurer looking to minimize its exposure.199 Because of the
way in which we insist on doing legal battle-and plaintiffs' lawyers share
the blame here with defendants' representatives and the insurance indus-
try-too many of our conflicts are settled (either by adjudication or
grudging agreement) but not resolved, and we part company all the more
convinced of our victimhood, rather than being reconciled to a world
populated by decent but erring individuals.200
C. Unburdening the System
Our system of tort litigation places a significant burden on the com-
munity in the form of transaction costs. Tort litigation involves not only
direct public expenditures to support the court system, but also expendi-
tures to support the phalanx of lawyers, insurance adjusters, expert wit-
nesses, and law professors (myself included) who are directly or indirectly
sustained by such litigation. Before proceeding any further, I must add an
important caveat: While tort litigation has expanded over the past three
decades, the expansion of commercial litigation and its attendant costs
prefer an acknowledgment that wrong has been done to them to receiving
money. Once lawyers are engaged and the legal system, even if only informally,
has been mobilized, the adversarial structure of problem-solving forces polariza-
tion and routinization of demands and stifles a host of possible solutions.
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute
Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 25, 33 (1985).
199. Even settlements often place the immediate interests of the parties, their counsel,
and their insurers ahead of the long-term interests of the public. An increasing number of
civil cases are concluded with a settlement and a court order sealing the record. According
to one U.S. District Judge who has been instrumental in the settlement of several mass tort
cases, "it is almost impossible to settle many mass tort cases without a secrecy agreement."
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rav. 469, 510
(1994).
Apart from general First Amendment concerns, secrecy in cases involving mass torts,
environmental hazards, and products liability serves to hide ongoing dangers to the public.
The rationale that parties in an adversary system are entitled to resolve their own disputes,
without regard to the public interest, is unconvincing when the parties have used the public
courts to process their disputes and maintain secrecy. Says Judge Weinstein, "A publicly
maintained legal system ought not protect those who engage in misconduct, conceal the
cause of injury from the victims, or render future victims vulnerable." Id. at 516-17.
Through either legislative or judicial intervention, the interests of the community should be
protected, even at the settlement stage. See, e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 1990)
(prohibiting concealment of public hazards and giving standing to affected third parties to
challenge rulings).
200. By the conclusion of litigation, this "victimhood" includes not only plaintiffs, but
also defendants, who feel abused by the process and the superficial manner in which dis-
putes are settled. See, e.g., RICHARD SELZER, DOWN FROM TROY: A DOCTOR COMES OF AGE
102-23 (1992) (describing the dehumanizing effect of medical malpractice litigation).
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has far eclipsed that in the personal injury field over the same period.2 0 1
Those who cast tassel-loafered personal injury lawyers as scapegoats
might redirect their outrage at the business community, which imposes
an increasingly heavy burden on the public court system to adjudicate
private commercial disputes. If anything, tort litigants have greater rea-
son to avail themselves of the public court system. Most parties to tort
actions are strangers who, prior to the dispute, had no occasion to agree
upon a private forum in which to resolve their differences. Parties to com-
mercial cases, however, have had pre-existing relationships, usually gov-
erned by contract, through which they can agree to a private forum-such
as arbitration or a rent-a-judge program-to resolve disputes, should they
arise. The availability of public courts charging only token filing fees to
adjudicate these disputes amounts to a public subsidy of private commer-
cial activity.202 This may be necessary to the functioning of the commu-
nity, but we should be cognizant of the costs.
I have discussed earlier the far more serious toll that tort litigation
exacts upon the community. The prevailing system of tort litigation con-
tributes to the sense that we are engaged, not in a common enterprise,
but in a race to the courthouse to see who can grab the brass ring while it
is still there. The overwhelming impression is that tort litigation is all a
game, that justice, fair play, and responsibility have little to do with it,
that one can at least extract (dare I say extort) a few grand from the
defendant and its insurance company by bringing suit, and that this is all
part of the American way.2'0 To the extent this attitude is incorporated
into jury behavior, it gathers momentum, as verdict after verdict tells the
Francisco Merinos of our country that they are suckers if they miss out
on the payoff.204
201. A study by Marc Galanter and Joel Rogers shows that contract cases, not tort
cases, represent by far the category of greatest growth. Milo Geyelin, Feuding Firms Cram
Courts, Study Says, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 9.
202. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 366, 372
(1986). Judge Posner states:
I am not persuaded that making settlement cheaper to the parties is the
solution to the caseload crisis. I would prefer to make the parties bear a larger
fraction of the total costs of trial, including the queueing costs that trials impose
on other parties. A recent study found that the average out-of-pocket cost to the
federal government of certain tort cases tried by jury is $15,028-and this ex-
cludes the queueing costs. But the fee for filing a case in federal district court is
only $60.
Id. at 392-93.
203. I am not sure whether this attitude is shamed or fostered by the popular litera-
ture excoriating the tort system, as exemplified by Mike Royko's earlier-cited column. See
Royko, supra note 10, at C3; see also Barry, supra note 10, at 33 (describing "the Case of
the Denture Adhesive Menace," in which SmithKline Beecham paid $1,000,000, plus $2,800
in coupons, in settlement of a class action products liability suit over a denture adhesive
found to contain the carcinogen benzine, despite the absence of any showing of actual harm
to the plaintiffs).
204. At least one recent study suggests that juries are conscious of this problem, and
have become less charitable toward plaintiffs. See Perez-Pena, supra note 127, at Al.
[Vol. 30
TORT LAW
This phenomenon both contributes to and reflects the fraying of the
communal fabric that Etzioni and Hughes so deplore. When injured par-
ties and the juries before which they appear feel alienated from the
American enterprise, when they see corporations more interested in the
bottom line than in producing worthwhile goods and services, 20 5 when
politicians, preoccupied with the next election, pander to narrow interests
rather than committing themselves to public service,206 there appears lit-
tle reason not to pursue (or aid another in pursuing) one's piece of the
pie, regardless of the costs to the greater community. That is why some of
us see such promise in the alternative dispute resolution movement, and
in mediation in particular. Mediation is an attractive alternative not be-
cause it reduces transaction costs, for sometimes it does not. Rather, the
true virtue of mediation is the possibility that disputing parties might
develop respect for each other's legitimate interests, and seek mutual ac-
commodation.20 7 Instead of pursuing a larger piece of a fixed pie, through
alternatives to litigation we can perhaps find ways to enlarge the pie, for
the betterment of the greater community.208
The present state of tort litigation reflects a society which has be-
come increasingly fragmented by the relentless pursuit of self-interest. So
long as insurance adjusters are schooled in obtaining quick, cheap settle-
ments, plaintiff's lawyers will continue to descend like locusts upon mass-
disaster scenes. So long as legislators continue to vote as directed by lob-
byists, rather than after careful study of the merits of proposed legisla-
tion, jurors will continue to vote their prejudices and fears, rather than
It may be significant that excessive jury awards receive far more media attention than
do cases in which apparently worthy plaintiffs fail to recover. About the same time as the
widely reported coffee burn suit against McDonald's, see supra notes 127-29, a U.S. District
Court in Massachusetts dismissed an action brought on behalf of a woman who had died
due to failure of a heart catheter which the manufacturer knew to have been defective ten
months prior to death. Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994), af'd,
1995 WL 470265 (1st Cir. 1995). For a commentary on the Talbott case, see Mitchell Zuck-
off, Two U.S. Agencies Side with Missouri Women in Bard Catheter Suit, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 5, 1994, Business at 19. The case escaped the attention of most of the media.
205. Until fairly recently, corporations, however rapacious, seemed to care genuinely
about the products they made and the services they provided. Henry Ford (whatever his
faults, which are legend) wanted to make cars. Andrew Carnegie wanted to make steel. Walt
Disney wanted to make movies. Too many modern corporate managers simply want to make
money.
206. ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 209-25.
207. "Mediated outcomes empower parties by responding to them as unique individu-
als with particular problems, rather than as depersonalized representatives of general
problems faced by classes of actors or by society as a whole." Robert A. Baruch Bush, Effi-
ciency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethi-
cal Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 268 (1989). Mediation also promotes "the
value of escaping our alienated isolation and rediscovering our common humanity, even in
the midst of bitter division." Id. at 270.
208. See Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American
Mediators, 99 HARv. L. RFv. 1876, 1878-79 (1986) (discussing "communitarian mediators");
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 4 (1983) (advancing a communitarian argu-
ment for non-judicial resolution of conflicts).
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decide cases on the merits. But if we pause to inquire about what really
makes us whole, if we become willing to make a living instead of a killing,
we may find a longing that is satisfied not by the big win, but for some-
thing more modest yet more fulfilling: a spirit of community.
CONCLUSION
The law of torts should be a mechanism for improving the overall
quality of life in our society. It can perform this function by supporting
whistleblowers who serve the public interest; by holding accountable cor-
porations that pollute the air, poison our bodies, and inflict carnage on
the public; and by encouraging each one of us to be a little more responsi-
ble toward ourselves and toward each other. There are those who view the
tort system merely as a device for providing compensation to individuals
who have suffered harm. But that goal, laudable as it may be, could be
achieved through a less expensive no-fault system. If we are to find any
justification for the expensive, time-consuming apparatus of the tort sys-
tem, it is in its ability to reinforce a code of conduct that implores us to
be more responsible citizens for the greater good.
At the same time, the law of torts must not exact such a toll on pub-
lic resources, both through the duties it imposes on civic institutions and
the transaction costs of operating the system, so as to impair the ability
of public institutions to function for the community's benefit. In this con-
text, we should view government not as nursemaid to an ever-demanding
public, but as the apparatus through which citizens enforce a code of con-
duct and maintain a measure of equilibrium in our society. The theories
of liability now being employed to stretch the limits of recovery could be
used as crude bludgeons to inflict grave damage on the community. More
judicious exercise of the legal machinery, recognizing the fragility of ex-
isting social structures, is needed.
I have not attempted to explore comprehensively all tort issues as
they relate to communitarianism. An entire article could be devoted to
the communitarian implications of environmental torts, including per-
haps the need to relax requirements of standing and causation in order to
advance the public good.2 09 Likewise, we could devote considerable time
and space to the communitarian ramifications of a no-fault social insur-
ance system. Such a system might focus less on blame and more on the
restoration of injured people to productive lives in the community,
through a broader distribution of responsibility for compensation.10 On
209. For example, Professor Baruch Bush has suggested that communitarian theory
could be used to justify the relaxation of the rules of causation in environmental and other
toxic torts. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds, supra note 6, at 1551-61.
210. For example, Professor Stephen D. Sugarman has proposed replacing the tort
system with an alternative compensation scheme for accident victims. First, his scheme
would take the small cases out of the tort system, eliminate pain and suffering awards and
cut out the lawyers in order to redirect funds toward compensation for temporarily disabled
victims who have not been intentionally or gravely wronged by conduct of another. This
would be achieved by providing universal health care and an income replacement system for
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the negative side of the communitarian coin, such a system might erode a
sense of responsibility and produce inefficiencies through externalization
of costs.
I suspect that this article will disappoint, and even anger, some ad-
herents to the communitarian cause. While others have seen in communi-
tarianism a basis for expanding tort duties and consequent liability, I
have also seen it as a rationale for limiting the largess of the tort system.
Deny me credentials as a "true" communitarian if you must. But I see a
need to give short shrift to marginal cases if we are to preserve the appa-
ratus that gives meaning to important cases. A sense of community re-
quires giving as well as taking, and generosity of spirit may, in some
instances, require that we demand less rather than more of our fellow
citizens.
I do not believe that we should all meekly tuck in our tails, forego
our legal remedies, and become team players. I do believe, however, that
we should fashion our legal rules in a manner conducive to individual
responsibility, recognizing that the public should give as well as get, and
thereby play the role of citizens, not supplicants. We also should promote
dispute resolution methods conducive to mutual understanding and ac-
commodation, and the realization that we are not disparate entities look-
ing only for self-aggrandizement, but interdependent beings in search of a
sense of community.
people with moderate injuries.
Second, for serious medical injuries, Sugarman proposes a no-fault system similar to
that of New Zealand. This system would collect revenues from gasoline taxes, from drivers
based on their driving records and experience and from a vehicle safety index in order to
promote behavior control and fairness.
Finally, Professor Sugarman proposes improving Social Security benefits to even out
the treatment of the disabled generally, and not favor accident victims. Social Security
would be the primary source and no-fault compensation would be supplemental. Therefore,
claimants would seek Social Security first and resort to the no-fault compensation scheme
for further needed funds.
Professor Sugarman favors a community responsibility approach to compensation and
believes that compensation should be separated from behavior control and fair punishment.
Steven D. Sugarman, Beyond Compensation: Dealing With Accidents in the 21st Century,
15 U. HAW. L. REv. 659, 663-70 (1993).
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